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This special issue of Court Review focuses on media matters. Oneprovocative question related to media is the purported impact of aniconic television show, Crime Scene Investigation (CSI), on the judicial
process. In the past few years, it has been frequently suggested, especially in
the media, that judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and jurors have
become influenced by CSI. The allegation is that the “CSI-effect” has resulted
in an expectation that forensic evidence is required for successful criminal
prosecutions. But is there (apologies to Gertrude Stein) a there there? Three
articles in the special issue examine the so-called CSI-effect.  Professors
Steven Smith, Veronica Stinson, and Marc Patry of Saint Mary’s University
(Halifax, Nova Scotia) find evidence there is, but they wonder whether the
effect is not a juror-problem but rather mani-
fests itself in the ways that attorneys behave.
Judge Donald Shelton (also an adjunct profes-
sor, Thomas Cooley Law School and Eastern
Michigan University) and his colleagues,
Professors Gregg Barak and Young Kim
(Eastern Michigan University), have found
something is going on, but suggest it is a “tech
effect” rather than a specific effect of television
shows such as CSI or Law and Order.
Professors Cole (University of California,
Irvine) and Dioso-Villa (Griffith University,
Brisbane, Australia) are skeptical but provide valuable guidance for protecting
the judicial system against any impacts from real or imagined effects. 
Media issues are more than just reactions to TV shows, of course. Media
are often the leading edge of the public in how they view or understand law
and the courts. Judge Alsdorf (now jurist-in-residence at Seattle University
School of Law and private practice arbitrator/mediator) offers a comprehen-
sive view of how judges might think about handling cases, including com-
munications in orders, decisions, and otherwise in working with the media.
His tips stem from high-profile-case management, but are applicable as well
for judicial interactions in many cases. Judge Leben offers 10 tips for judges
culled from his time on the bench and his background and contacts in the
communications field. Also relevant to the special issue is the book review of
Courts and Judges on Trial by an Australian academic and jurist, Dr. Cannon;
the book is authored by Pamela Schulz, an Australian scholar, and it analyzes
judicial and media relationships, as well as judicial relationships with elected
officials. The last item in the issue is an AJA bylaws amendment for member-
ship to review. 
Stay tuned!—Alan J. Tomkins, Co-Editor
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Time flies when you are having fun! This will be my last
message to you as president of the AJA. I would like to take this
opportunity to thank the membership, the Board of Governors,
the Executive Committee, and Shelley Rockwell, our
Association Manager, for giving me this opportunity and for
your continued support.  
I would like to highlight some of the activities during my
tenure.  Along with attending national conferences, I am orga-
nizing and coordinating the AJA
Symposium/Workshop scheduled for the 2012
midyear conference in Nashville—a  midyear
meeting NOT to be missed!  
I have also participated in “branding” the
AJA.  This branding has established a website
address that specifically utilizes the AJA name as
opposed to an address with an address flowing
from the National Center for State Courts’ web-
site. The new website address is www.american-
judgesassociation.net.  The .org was already
taken by the American Jailers Association—
somewhat of a far cry from our mission. In that vein, I have also
worked to further the reach and use of our exclusive trade-
mark, the “Voice of the Judiciary.®” I am also developing a
children’s school education project with Judge Charles Gill’s
nonprofit organization.  We are hoping to secure joint funding
from the Bill Gates Foundation. 
Lastly, and I believe most importantly, I continue to foster
relations with National Center for State Courts (NCSC), the
National Association for Court Management (NACM), the
National Association of State Judicial Educators (NASJE), and
the National College of Probate Judges (NCPJ).  We just con-
tracted with NCSC to assist the AJA in securing more vendors
for our conferences and, therefore, more conference revenue. I
attended the NACM midyear meeting and participated in a
panel discussion; they are reciprocating by sending panelists to
our San Diego conference. We attempted to join NASJE for a
conference but were unable to do so at this time. But did how-
ever connect with NCPJ  for a joint conference in 2013 or 2014.
And we positioned the AJA very well for joint judicial confer-
ences with conference-site states as we did in
Colorado.  We will be having a joint conference
with California judges in San Diego this
September, with Louisiana judges in 2013, and
potentially with Washington, Oregon, and
Canadian judges in 2015.   
As I reflect upon my tenure, I keep thinking
about the future of our association.  Will we have
the leadership necessary not only to carry out the
mission of the association but to grow it?  We
have had many great leaders over the years, and
as l look at the faces that continue to participate
in committees and conferences, I am hopeful that more judges
will come forward and take the wheel.  
We now have in place a strategic plan. Keep your eye out for
a special update report on it. With this plan, inspired leader-
ship, and a motivated membership, we can continue to develop
this association as the preeminent judicial organization.  So if
you have a desire to become a leader in this association, now is
the time to come forward.  Apply for the officer and Board of
Governor’s positions.  Attend an Executive Committee meeting
and bring yourself and your ideas along.  An organization is
only as good as its members. Farewell. 
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President’s Column
Mary Celeste
AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION FUTURE CONFERENCES
2011 Annual Conference
San Diego, California
Westin Gaslamp
September 11-16
$199 single/double
2012 Midyear Meeting
Nashville, Tennessee
Doubletree Hotel
May 17-19
$129 single/double
2012 Annual Conference
New Orleans, Louisiana
Sheraton New Orleans
September 30-October 5
$169 single/double
2013 Annual Conference
Kohala Coast, Hawaii
The Fairmont Orchid
September 22-27
$219 single/double
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Reflections from Police and Forensic Investigators, 5 CAN. J. POLICE
& SECURITY SERVICES, 125, 125-33 (2007). 
11. Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, CSI and Its Effects:  Media,
Juries, and the Burden of Proof, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 435, 435-69
(2007), at 447.
12. Cole & Dioso-Villa, supra note 11, at 448.
13. Tyler, supra note 8, at 1064; Cole & Dioso-Villa, supra note 11, at
448.
14. E.g., Michael D. Mann, Comment, The “CSI Effect”:  Better Jurors
through Television and Science?, 24 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 211 (2006).
15. State v. Cooke, 914 A.2d 1078 (Del. 2007).
Anyone who has been to a crime lab or experienced thepresentation of forensic evidence in open court knowsthat there is a disconnect between the way forensic sci-
ence is depicted on popular television programs and the real-
ity of criminal investigations. The number of forensically
themed television shows and popular entertainment has
exploded over the last decade, and shows such as Crime Scene
Investigation (CSI) and its related spin-offs are among the most
popular shows in North America. Indeed, CSI is consistently
among the top ten shows in a given week,1 and CSI:  Miami was
rated the most popular television show in the world in 2005.2
These and other television crime dramas,3 “true life” crime
shows,4 and popular books5 have piqued interest in the power
of forensic analysis to solve crimes. This has not remained in
the fictional realm. Recently, newspapers and television news
programs have focused on new forensic techniques, and fre-
quently focus on the importance of forensic evidence pre-
sented in real life trials6 for convicting the guilty. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, this perceived increase in interest
in forensic investigations and the value of forensic science has
made people wonder what effect, if any, it may be having on
juror decision making and jury verdicts. The news media7 are
also wondering, and have been exploring opinions and pro-
viding anecdotes of how television crime dramas may be influ-
encing the ways in which people think about criminal investi-
gations and behave relative to the legal system.8 Perhaps due to
its prominence on television (episodes can be seen at any time
of day in most time zones) the media has typically referred to
this potential influence as the “CSI effect.”
WHAT IS THE CSI EFFECT?
Typically, media reports of the CSI effect include references
to an undesirable effect exhibited during jury trials, which
results from jurors’ reactions to the presence or absence of
“appropriate” scientific evidence as trial exhibits.9 Essentially,
the argument is that watching CSI causes jurors to have unre-
alistic expectations about the quantity, quality, and availability
of scientific evidence.10 When the scientific evidence presented
at trial fails to meet jurors’ television-enhanced expectations,
they are more likely to acquit the defendant. This version of
the CSI effect is what Cole and Dioso-Villa call the Strong
Prosecutor’s Effect.11
Cole and Dioso-Villa also refer to the Weak Prosecutor’s
Effect, which focuses on the effect that CSI may have on pros-
ecutors’ behaviors.12 Specifically, the Weak Prosecutor’s Effect
describes behaviors designed to counter jurors’ supposed
heightened expectations of forensic science. These are essen-
tially tactical changes that do not necessarily change trial out-
comes, but are relevant to the legal community. A less common
version of the CSI effect—at least as reported by the media—is
one that favors the defense bar.13 This position argues that the
favorable portrayal of forensic scientists in the media increases
their credibility, making their testimony highly compelling and
influential in verdicts.
The CSI effect is being discussed in legal circles14 and in
legal decisions. Most notably, in State v. Cooke, the Superior
Court of Delaware explored the relevance and impact of the
CSI effect.15 In this case, Cooke challenged the prosecution’s
use of ten types of forensic evidence (including DNA, footwear
impressions, tool marks, handwriting, and fabric impressions,
among others) as being either exculpatory or unreliable, and as
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20. Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, CSI:  MARICOPA COUNTY:  THE
CSI EFFECT AND ITS REAL-LIFE IMPACT ON JUSTICE (2005), available
at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/jc2008/references/csi/CSI_Effect_
report.pdf
21. See e.g., Duane T. Wegener, Norbert L. Kerr, Monique A. Fleming
& Richard E. Petty, Flexible Correction of Juror Judgments:
Implications for Jury Instructions, 6 PSYCH PUB POL, & L. 629, 629-
54 (2000).
22. See Duane T. Wegener & Richard E. Petty, The Flexible Correction
Model:  The Role of Naïve Theories of Bias in Correction, in 29
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 141 (Mark P. Zanna
ed., 1997).
23. Podlas, supra note 8, at 454.
24. Donald E. Shelton, Young S. Kim & Gregg Barak, A Study of Juror
Expectations and Demands Concerning Scientific Evidence:  Does the
“CSI Effect” Exist?, 9 VANDERBILT J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331, 349
(2006).
such it should have been excluded.16 The State argued that it
needed to produce this evidence for the jury for two reasons:
1) to demonstrate to the jury that it has a solid case grounded
in the products of a thorough investigation; and 2) to offset the
heightened expectations of the prosecution that the State
believes jurors hold due to the CSI effect. Interestingly,
although the Court found that there was no scientific evidence
to support the existence of the CSI effect, it also could not
deny its own experience of juries’ heightened expectations of
forensically relevant evidence.
Some attorneys and trial consultants have also noticed this
purported increase in jurors’ expectations and have incorpo-
rated this issue into their trial strategy. Consider the well-pub-
licized case of Robert Durst who was acquitted of murder. In
this case, defense jury consultant Robert Hirschhorn’s jury
selection strategy included using CSI viewing habits as a crite-
rion for retaining prospective jurors. “In the Durst case…we
had a lot of jurors . . . that watched those kinds of shows
because we knew that the fact that the head was missing, and
the head of Morris Black was where the cause of death was, in
the absence of that, the prosecution couldn’t win. . .”17
As both Winter and York18 and the State v. Cooke decision19
suggest, the lack of clarity surrounding the CSI effect puts the
prosecution in an awkward position. If the prosecution pre-
sents forensic evidence simply for the sake of presenting such
evidence, it risks criticism for presenting irrelevant exhibits.
Alternatively, not presenting such evidence means the prose-
cution risks disappointing the jury. Winter and York end their
review of the case by calling for additional empirical evidence
to be brought to bear on the question of the nature and impact
of the CSI effect. Because several empirical studies have been
published since the State v. Cooke decision, the purpose of this
paper is to provide an overview of what is currently known
about the nature and impact of the so-called CSI effect.  
RECENT RESEARCH ON THE CSI EFFECT
One of the first in-depth analyses of the CSI effect came
from an examination of the perceptions and behaviors of mem-
bers of the Maricopa County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office.20
Maricopa County conducted a survey of 102 prosecutors to
assess how lawyers perceived CSI and related shows to be hav-
ing an impact on legal proceedings. Importantly, the Maricopa
County report also addressed how prosecutors are responding
to the perceived impact of the CSI effect. One result of the sur-
vey is clear—these lawyers believe CSI is having an effect on
jurors. Thirty-eight percent of attorneys reported they had lost
a case because of the CSI effect; 45% contended that jurors
relied on scientific evidence more than they should; and 72%
maintained that CSI fans exerted undue influence on other
jurors. In terms of solutions to the problem, 70% of prosecu-
tors asked jurors about television-viewing habits during voir
dire, 90% took the time to explain police procedures to jurors
during testimony, and an astounding 52% plea bargained cases
when they thought CSI-educated jurors might object to the
evidence (or lack thereof) presented in the case. It is clear that
CSI is having an effect on some prosecutors, but the question
of whether or not it influences other players in the legal system
remains to be answered.
If it is true that there is no real CSI effect, the approach of
trying to counter the perception of a CSI effect may be coun-
terproductive, as countering a bias that does not exist may
actually backfire. Indeed, the social psychological literature is
clear that instructions (e.g., judicial instructions given to a
jury before deliberations) designed to overcome a bias are most
effective if one is clear about the nature and corrections of the
existing bias.21 Incorrect assessment of bias can lead to people
over- or under-correcting for that bias.22 Of course, the legal
community is interested in whether or not crime dramas influ-
ence jury outcomes. 
To date, little evidence addresses this question, but two
studies inform this issue. In Podlas’s study, participants read a
scenario of an alleged rape, which was based entirely on the
credibility of witnesses (no forensic evidence was presented),
then rendered a verdict and reported on the basis for their deci-
sion.23 Importantly, Podlas also examined the extent to which
CSI-viewing habits influenced juror decisions. Podlas found
that frequent viewers of CSI were no more likely to cite the
lack of forensic evidence for their not-guilty verdicts as com-
pared to infrequent viewers. 
In a survey of 1,027 Michigan prospective jurors, Shelton,
Kim, and Barak found that 46% of summoned jurors expected
to see some kind of scientific evidence as part of the prosecu-
tion’s case.24 When asked to consider more serious charges
(e.g., murder), the proportion of summoned jurors who
expected to see forensic evidence increased to 74%.
Interestingly, watching CSI was only marginally associated
with increased expectations of scientific evidence and assess-
ments of guilt, but the reasons for this trend are unclear. 
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25. Content analysis, in this context, means that we coded the data
about the television programs (these data are termed “qualitative”
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DNA, fingerprinting, etc.) discussed in this paragraph.
26. See Patry et al., supra note 10, at 294.
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28. See Marc W. Patry, Veronica Stinson & Steven M. Smith, Blurring
the Line between Fact and Fiction: Expert Opinions about Forensic
Investigation Tools Represented on CSI, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2007
NORTH AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PSYCHOLOGY
CONFERENCE (2008, pp. 94-97).
29. See Stinson et al., supra note 10, at 125.
30. Eighty-three police officers, 28 medical examiners, 7 fire/arson
investigators, and 6 others. 
31. See Stinson et al., supra note 10, at 130.
32. Steven M. Smith, Veronica Stinson, and Marc W. Patry, Exploring
the CSI Effect:  Is It Real? If so, What Is It?, Address at North
American Correctional and Criminal Justice Psychology
Conference, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN
CORRECTIONAL & CRIMINAL JUSTICE PSYCHOLOGY CONFERENCE,
2008, at 83., at 83.
RECENT RESEARCH ON THE CSI EFFECT
In addition to the above cited research, we have conducted
a substantial amount of research exploring the nature and con-
sequences of the CSI effect. We first wanted to achieve a com-
prehensive understanding of how the CSI effect was described
in the media. Therefore, we analyzed 250 newspaper articles
from a broad array of media outlets. We found that the CSI
effect tended to be described as having one of four impacts:  1)
increasing student interest in forensically relevant topics (e.g.,
anthropology, biology, psychology), which results in higher
student enrollments in relevant courses and programs; 2) edu-
cating criminals in how to engage in criminal activity without
getting caught; 3) influencing jurors to acquit defendants; and
4) influencing how lawyers and other legal professionals
behave. Interestingly, these news reports frequently character-
ized the CSI effect as having a negative effect. 
Our next study was a content analysis25 of the first seasons
of CSI and CSI:  Miami.26 We documented the types of forensic
procedures portrayed, the frequency of errors, and the fre-
quency with which criminals were caught. We identified that
in the two first seasons, over 75 types of forensic evidence were
portrayed in the various storylines. The two most popular
forms of evidence presented in any particular storyline were
DNA (19%) and fingerprinting (12%). Consistent with Tyler’s
expectations, the criminal was caught in 97% of the story-
lines.27 Importantly, technical errors and mistakes were rare
and were always caught before any negative consequences
could arise. Contrary to real-life investigation, crime scene
investigators conducted 72% of the scientific tests portrayed
on CSI. In actual investigations, specialized laboratory techni-
cians conduct the majority of tests. Thus, there appears to be a
clear difference between actual forensic investigations and
their popular portrayals. 
To assess the discrepancies between reality and fiction, we
conducted a survey of 15 forensic experts employed by
Canadian police agencies.28 Participants were selected for their
expertise in specific areas of forensic analysis, including iden-
tification services, major crimes, police dog service, blood
stain analysis, audio and video analysis, facial identification
artistry, firearms, biology, anthropology, odontology, traffic,
entomology, and forward-looking infrared. The forensic
experts were presented with a catalogue of 73 forensic tech-
niques. Each technique was identified by name and a descrip-
tion of how the technique was portrayed on CSI. Experts com-
mented only on those forensic techniques for which they had
expertise. Overall, experts indicated that the accuracy levels of
the CSI shows to be relatively low, rating them as 2.5 on a 7-
point scale. The specific techniques however, were given rela-
tively positive ratings. The realism of the procedures was above
the midpoint of the 7-point scale (M = 4.6), and experts
reported that the scientific research supporting the use of the
portrayed techniques was quite high (M = 5.9). The reliabil-
ity/accuracy of the techniques, however, were rated quite low
on the scale (M = 1.9), which likely reflects that CSI often por-
trays highly technical, experimental techniques. 
In two subsequent studies we surveyed other legal profes-
sionals to assess their views on the CSI effect itself.29 First we
surveyed 127 death investigators30 on their perceptions of the
CSI effect, as well as the extent to which watching crime dra-
mas had influenced their day-to-day interactions with the pub-
lic. The death investigators confirmed that crime dramas are
somewhat inaccurate in their portrayals, and have changed the
way in which police practice, investigate, and interact with the
public. The vast majority (94%) indicated that television crime
shows had influenced the public’s expectations of their profes-
sion and conduct. Our next study asked a similar set of ques-
tion for 36 “on the beat” police officers, but added follow-up
questions on the extent to which CSI and similar shows influ-
enced juries, criminal behaviors, and perceptions of the legal
system. Although most of the police officers (68%) indicated
that CSI had no effect on their behavior, consistent with the
death investigators study, almost all (92%) indicated that the
shows had some effect on public expectations. Interestingly, all
respondents felt that CSI affected people’s perceived knowledge
of forensic techniques, but most thought that knowledge
gained from these shows was inaccurate. Police officers esti-
mated that the shows depicted a 94% solution rate (very simi-
lar to our content analysis findings), yet they estimated that
only 40% of crimes are solved in the real world.31
We next turned to the impact crime dramas may be having
on potential jurors.32 We surveyed 320 jury-eligible adults
from a wide range of age and employment backgrounds on
their perceptions of several types of evidence, including DNA,
fingerprinting, toxicology, confession evidence, eyewitness evi-
dence, compositional description of materials (e.g., the per-
centage of base materials found in bullets), arson evidence,
physical pathology, ballistics, matching (i.e., fiber), and hand-
writing analysis. DNA and fingerprint evidence were consis-
tently rated by the public as significantly more reliable than
other forms of evidence. 
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33. See Smith et al., supra note 10, at 189.
34. See Smith et al., supra note 10, at 190.
35. See Shelton et al., supra note 24, at 362.
36. Id. 
37. See Wegener et al., supra note 21, at 629.
38. See, e.g., Tyler, supra note 8, at 1050.
Of course, the real question is, how are public perceptions
influenced by television-viewing habits? To assess this we col-
lected data from 148 participants on beliefs regarding forensic
evidence (as above) and their self-reported viewing of CSI and
Law and Order (as well as almost 30 other television pro-
grams).33 Increased viewing of forensically themed crime dra-
mas predicted favorable views toward a number of types of sci-
entific evidence (but importantly, not non-scientific evidence).
Thus watching CSI and related shows does seem to influence
beliefs about forensic evidence. Of course, the reverse may be
true—perhaps people who believe in the validity of these tech-
niques gravitate toward crime drama for their entertainment.
Thus, the causal relationship was not yet established.
Therefore, we conducted another study to test a causal link
between exposure to CSI and attitudes toward forensic evi-
dence. 
We randomly assigned 190 university students to watch
zero, four, or eight episodes of CSI.34 Compared to those who
did not view CSI, participants who watched four to eight
episodes of CSI had higher estimates of the accuracy and reli-
ability of DNA and fingerprint analysis, and had more confi-
dence in their judgments about the reliability of DNA analysis.
It is quite possible that this effect occurs because DNA and fin-
gerprint analysis are the techniques most commonly portrayed
on the show.  Nonetheless, this study shows that with exposure
to as few as four episodes of CSI, people’s perceptions of foren-
sic evidence can start to change. 
In the final study we will present here, perhaps most rele-
vant to legal proceedings, we explored the extent to which
people’s attitudes toward forensic evidence can be altered
based on interventions. Specifically, in an attempt to counter
the impact of television crime dramas on potential jurors’ atti-
tudes, we showed 63 jury-eligible adults a video titled
“Reasonable Doubt,” produced by CNN. The video has four
segments, which provide a critical examination of the quality
of DNA, compositional, fingerprint, and fiber evidence. After
watching the video (initial attitudes had been recorded weeks
earlier in an ostensibly unrelated task) participants rated foren-
sic techniques as less reliable. Importantly, and consistent with
our previous work, watching the documentary did not influ-
ence ratings of non-scientific evidence (motive, opportunity,
confessions, and alibi evidence). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
To date, and based on the results of the studies we and oth-
ers have conducted, it seems clear that some form of CSI effect
does exist. In addition to bringing their life experiences and
common sense to the deliberation room, jurors may also be
bringing their understanding of the legal system and forensic
evidence as portrayed on recent episodes of CSI and Law and
Order. Shelton et al. suggest that the source of jurors’ increased
expectations of forensic evidence is not simply television crime
dramas but the result of a more widespread cultural change
linked to a technological and scientific revolution.35 They
argue that a more accurate term for this phenomenon is the
“tech effect.”36 Regardless of which terminology is used, are
jurors’ demands for and expectations surrounding forensic evi-
dence jeopardizing justice? To our knowledge, there is no evi-
dence supporting this notion. 
It also seems clear that some lawyers believe television
crime dramas affect juror expectations of forensic science and
are modifying their trial strategies to compensate for an antic-
ipated CSI effect. Are these countermeasures justified? What
consequences might these actions have? An important and
related question that remains unanswered is how the CSI effect
influences trial proceedings.  The results of our research, as
well as the research done by the Maricopa County Prosecutors’
office, suggests that legal professionals are working to counter
the CSI effect. Yet, to date there is no evidence that the CSI
effect has any influence on jury decision making. 
Thus, based on research by Wegener et al.,37 we must ask if
the effort made by prosecutors to counter the CSI effect may in
fact be creating a problem rather than solving one. Indeed, our
research suggests that people who watch CSI judge forensic
evidence to be more reliable and accurate. This supports the
notion of a pro-prosecution bias when that evidence is pro-
vided at trial.38 Understanding the nature and magnitude of
any bias is necessary before any intervention is appropriate, or
else a larger problem could be created than the one being
“fixed.” 
Many questions surrounding the CSI effect remain unan-
swered. More research is needed to understand fully the nature
and consequences of watching television crime dramas on
jurors. Although television crime dramas appear to be influ-
encing people’s views of forensic evidence, the police, criminal
investigations, and the courts, there is to date no evidence that
television crime dramas influence either jury decision making
or trial outcomes. 
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After a jury acquittal, the prosecutor explains the loss tothe assembled media by saying that the jurorsdemanded too much of the government. They “wrong-
fully” acquitted the defendant only because the television
show Crime Scene Investigation (“CSI”), or one of its many
spin-offs and copycats, overly influenced them. According to
the prosecutor, the jurors could not separate reality from fic-
tion when they did not see the same kinds of advanced scien-
tific evidence during the trial that is commonly depicted on
their television screens. This fictional scenario is played out in
many criminal cases. The news media quickly coined the term
“CSI effect” to refer to these common prosecutorial anecdotal
complaints, and it has been repeated and republished since CSI
first aired nine years ago.1 The popular media has almost uni-
versally accepted the prosecutor’s explanation for such jury
acquittals as true and has helped to construct the CSI effect as
a serious problem for the criminal justice system and a threat
to the sanctity of the jury system. 
The media-coined phrase “CSI effect” generally refers to the
allegation that jurors who watch CSI, or similar television pro-
grams, expect and demand scientific forensic evidence as por-
trayed on these shows and, when such evidence is not pro-
duced, that jurors wrongfully acquit defendants. The genesis of
the CSI effect on jury acquittals was anecdotal and subjective,
based primarily on the opinions of prosecutors, judges, and
other law enforcement officials.2
In 2006, we tested the validity of this popular notion and
conducted the first empirical study of the alleged CSI effect on
summoned jurors (the Washtenaw County Study). The study
involved a survey of 1,027 summoned jurors in Washtenaw
County, Michigan, about their television-watching habits, their
expectations for scientific evidence in particular types of cases,
and their likely verdicts in those particular cases when faced
with scenarios featuring various types of evidence.3 The data
showed that jurors had increased expectations for scientific
evidence, and that in cases based on circumstantial evidence,
jurors would be more likely to acquit a defendant if the gov-
ernment did not provide some form of scientific evidence.
However, the Washtenaw County Study data also showed no
significant correlation between those expectations and
demands and whether the jurors watched CSI or similar pro-
grams on television.4 We speculated that the cause of these
heightened juror expectations and demands represents a
broader change in our popular culture regarding the use of
modern science and technology, buttressed by media portray-
als of those scientific advances. We suggested that these evolv-
ing expectations and demands could more accurately be called
a “tech effect.”5
Washtenaw County is a suburban county in southeast
Michigan with a large university population. The demograph-
ics of the jurors showed a very high educational level consis-
tent with that setting. We thought it important, therefore, to
undertake a similar survey in a different jurisdiction. This fol-
low-up study in 2009 (the Wayne County Study) surveyed
jurors in Wayne County, which is centered in Detroit and is the
most populous jurisdiction in Michigan. It is a metropolitan
jurisdiction and the thirteenth most populous county in the
nation. The racial, educational, and income demographics of
the jurors in Wayne County are significantly different from the
demographics of the jurors in Washtenaw County. 
The Wayne County study also explored the suggestion of a
broader tech effect rather than a television-based CSI effect, or
even a more general effect of all media sources acting alone or
possibly in combination, as the causative agent for the
increased juror expectations and demands seen in the
Washtenaw County study. Similarly, the juror questionnaire in
the Wayne County study included additional questions that
were meant to gauge the jurors’ technological knowledge, use
of modern technology, interest in criminal justice news and
development, assumptions about the availability of modern
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forensic science capabilities in their local police crime labora-
tories, and expectations about how and when those capabili-
ties would be used.
THE CSI EFFECT AND THE TECH EFFECT
To determine the existence of the CSI effect, it is necessary
to separate and define the claimed effects, including the
observable attitudes and actions of jurors with regard to scien-
tific evidence, as well as the potential causes of that juror
behavior—such as watching CSI-type programs on television.
With respect to the claimed effects, the 2006 Washtenaw
County study showed high levels of juror expectations and
demands that the prosecutor would present scientific evidence.
The more recent Wayne County study reinforced those obser-
vations and revealed even higher levels of juror expectations
for scientific evidence in metropolitan jurors. However, as in
the Washtenaw County study, the Wayne County study
showed that most jurors still appeared to trust eyewitnesses,
perhaps misguidedly, and will rely on factual testimony to find
that the government has met its burden, even in the absence of
scientific evidence. Thus, jurors are not necessarily prepared to
acquit defendants due to a lack of scientific evidence alone. In
cases where there are no eyewitnesses and the government
relies on circumstantial evidence, the observation in Wayne
County is consistent with the prior observation in Washtenaw
County—jurors are much more likely to acquit if the govern-
ment‘s case does not include some scientific evidence.
However, it is not appropriate to characterize such acquittals as
wrongful, as prosecutors are wont to do when they lose such
cases.6 Researchers have found no evidence of a higher acquit-
tal rate that could be linked to the so-called CSI effect in state
courts.7 Thus, the CSI effect could be more appropriately
called the “CSI myth.” 
Data in the Washtenaw County and Wayne County studies
have demonstrated high expectations and demands for scien-
tific evidence among jurors. Other scholars and researchers
have found similarly high expectations and regard for scientific
evidence by jurors.8 If these expectations are the effect, then
what are the causes? Contrary to the prosecutor- and media-
promoted idea, the Washtenaw
County study data actually
ruled out watching CSI or simi-
lar programs and showed no
causal relationship between
jurors’ expectations and
demands for scientific evidence
and television-watching habits.
Subsequently, we refined and extended the analysis of the orig-
inal data pertaining to circumstantial evidence cases and eye-
witness evidence cases, performing a more sophisticated multi-
variate regression and path analysis and controlling for individ-
ual juror characteristics. This new data analysis reinforced the
original analysis.9 Neither the Washtenaw County study data,
nor any other studies involving jurors or potential jurors as
subjects, have demonstrated a causal relationship between jury
verdict behavior and watching CSI or other programs in that
genre.10 The Wayne County study reinforced that conclusion—
there is no CSI effect on jury expectations for scientific evi-
dence that influences their verdicts.
That conclusion, however, merely states the negative. If
watching CSI-type television programs does not cause juries to
acquit defendants in cases without scientific evidence, what
could be the cause of the jurors’ heightened expectations and
demands for scientific evidence? The lack of a correlation
between watching CSI and jurors’ expectations for scientific
evidence does not necessarily mean that watching a plethora of
forensic science television shows does not play a role in the
juror behavior we have documented. After the Washtenaw
County study, we theorized that a “tech effect,” rather than the
more specific CSI effect, causes these heightened expectations
and demands. This tech effect means that the origins of height-
ened juror expectations about scientific evidence lie in the
broader permeation of the changes in our popular culture
brought about by the confluence of rapid advances in science
and information technology and the increased use of crime sto-
ries as a vehicle to dramatize those advances.11 The last 30
years have brought about such scientific discoveries and devel-
opments that some have justifiably called it a “technology rev-
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6. For example, the Vice-President of the National Association of
District Attorneys declared, “Prosecutors are increasingly encoun-
tering the ‘CSI Effect’ among jurors even when they have strong
cases, with eyewitnesses and confessions by defendants. If they
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Really Exist?) to NDAA Talking Justice, http://communities.justic-
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olution.” In 2001, a Rand
Corporation study concluded
that “[b]eyond the agricul-
tural and industrial revolu-
tions of the past, a broad,
multidisciplinary technology
revolution is changing the
world.” 12 These new tech-
nologies have been used to
create a further information revolution in the wide availability
and quick transmission of information.13 These developments
in science and information are contemporaneous and interre-
lated. Advancements in science are fostered by the ability to
exchange and transfer information, and scientific develop-
ments almost immediately become available not only to scien-
tists but also to the entire world. 
The information technology system quickly makes scien-
tific discoveries and advancements part of our popular culture.
The dissemination of technological developments is fast and
widespread through various media, including the Internet, fic-
tion and nonfiction television programs, film, and traditional
news sources like television, newspapers, and magazines.
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is a prime example, as it has
gone from an abstract concept known only to the small bio-
chemical community to a term that is included in children’s
dictionaries.14 Ordinary people know, or at least think they
know, more about science and technology from what they have
learned in the media than they ever learned in school.15 These
ordinary people are the jury system, and they come into court
filled with years of information and preconceptions about sci-
ence in addition to their beliefs about the criminal adjudica-
tion process itself.16
Recent research has offered some support for our tech effect
hypothesis.17 Kiara Okita’s detailed regression analysis of 1,200
Canadian citizens’ responses to a random telephone survey
“suggest[s] that the ‘tech effect’ posited by Shelton et al. may
indeed relate to respondents having learned about forensic sci-
ence from a larger body of media than CSI, one which also
includes movies and other fictional television crime dramas,18
and that this larger ‘effect’ may also be a function of respon-
dents’ social location and particular life experiences.”19 In the
Wayne County study, we tested that tech effect theory and its
underlying assumption that jurors’ expectations are a reflec-
tion of broader scientific and technological changes in our
society. 
SURVEY MATERIALS AND PROCEDURES
Most of the survey questions administered in Wayne
County20 were the same questions that were used in the
Washtenaw County study. 21 These questions gathered infor-
mation about jurors’ television-watching habits,22 their expec-
tations about whether they would see various types of scien-
tific and other evidence in several criminal trial scenarios,23
their likely verdict in each of those scenarios depending on
whether their expectations were met,24 and a variety of demo-
graphic and victimization-related personal information.
However, the Wayne County survey also asked jurors for infor-
mation that was not requested as part of the Washtenaw
County study. Jurors were asked how interested they were in
information about crimes and trials and how often they
12. Philip S. Anton, Richard Silberglitt & James Schneider, The Global
Technology Revolution:  Bio/Nano/Materials Trends and Their
Synergies with Information by 2015 (2001) (available at
ht tp : / /www.rand .org /pubs /monograph_report s /2005/
MR1307.pdf); see also J.R. OKIN, THE TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION:
THE NOT FOR DUMMIES GUIDE TO THE IMPACT, PERILS, AND PROMISE
OF THE INTERNET (2005); RICHARD SILBERGLITT ET AL., THE GLOBAL
TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 2020, IN DEPTH ANALYSES:  BIO/NANO/
MATERIALS/ INFORMATION TRENDS, DRIVERS, BARRIERS, AND SOCIAL
IMPLICATIONS (2006), (available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/tech-
nical_reports/2006/RAND_ TR303.pdf).
13. See MICHAEL L. DERTOUZOS, THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION:  HUMAN
CENTERED COMPUTERS AND WHAT THEY CAN DO FOR US (2001);
Peter F. Drucker, Beyond the Information Revolution,  THE ATLANTIC,
Oct. 1999, at 47, 47-57 (available at http://www.theatlantic.com/
doc/ 199910/information-revolution).
14. See “D is for DNA,” LITTLE EXPLORERS ENGLISH PICTURE DICTIONARy,
http://www.enchantedlearning.com/Disfor.shtml (last visited Nov.
2, 2009).
15. See, e.g., GLENN REYNOLDS, AN ARMY OF DAVIDS:  HOW MARKETS AND
TECHNOLOGY EMPOWER ORDINARY PEOPLE TO BEAT BIG MEDIA, BIG
GOVERNMENT, AND OTHER GOLIATHS (2007).
16. Shelton et al., supra note 1, at 362-64 (citations omitted).
17. Okita, supra note 10, at 75. 
18. Id.
19. Id Even more directly, Okita concludes by stating, “I agree with
their assertions, and further the argument by contending that
forensic science, and by virtue of its content, that CSI, may have
become emblematic of both the rapid rate of scientific and tech-
nological change our society is continually undergoing, and of a
desire for a social certainty of justice that continues to wane.” Id.
at 106.
20. A copy of the survey is on file with the authors.
21. For a detailed description of the survey questions, see Shelton et
al., supra note 1, at 340-43.
22. The television program list was revised to reflect current pro-
gramming differences from the 2006 study.
23. Seven questions posed scenarios of the following types of cases
and charges:  every criminal case, murder or attempted murder,
physical assault of any kind, rape or other criminal sexual con-
duct, breaking and entering, any theft case, and any crime involv-
ing a gun. For each scenario, jurors were asked whether they
expected any of the following seven types of evidence:  eyewitness
testimony from the alleged victim, eyewitness testimony from at
least one other witness, circumstantial evidence, scientific evi-
dence of some kind, DNA evidence, fingerprint evidence, and bal-
listics or other firearms laboratory evidence. The choices for each
type of evidence were “yes,” “no,” or “unsure.”
24. Prior to this section, jurors were provided with the reasonable-
doubt and burden-of-proof jury instructions used in Michigan.
They were then asked how likely they were to find a defendant
guilty or not guilty based on certain types of evidence presented
in the seven various types of cases. Responses were made on a
five-value scale, including “I would find the defendant guilty,” “I
would probably find the defendant guilty,” “I am not sure what I
would do,” “I would probably find the defendant not guilty,” or “I
would find the defendant not guilty.”
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25. These responses were considerably higher than those we previ-
ously recorded in Washtenaw County where, for example, the
expectation for DNA in murder cases was 45.5%. Shelton et al.,
supra note 1, at 349.
26. Compared to 72.6% of Washtenaw County jurors who expected to
see DNA evidence in rape cases. Id.
obtained criminal justice information from sources ranging
from broadcast and print media to movies, television, and
Internet sources. They were then asked what crime laboratory
resources they thought were available to the local police and
when they thought those laboratory resources should be used
(i.e., in every criminal case, in every felony case, or only in
serious crimes such as murder, rape, or robbery). In the demo-
graphics section, additional questions were added to determine
whether jurors had various technology devices available to
them, including a computer at work or home, a cell phone
with or without text messaging or Internet access, cable or
satellite television at home, and a global positioning system
(GPS) or other electronic navigation device. 
The survey was administered during a six-week period to all
persons appearing for jury duty on Wednesdays at the facility
where state felony trials are conducted in Detroit. A judge
advised the jurors that it was for academic research purposes
only, that their responses would be anonymous and would not
impact their potential selection as jurors in any case, and that
participation was entirely voluntary. Of the 1,257 persons
appearing for jury duty, 1,219 completed valid surveys. 
THE EFFECT OF CSI-WATCHING ON METROPOLITAN
JURORS’ EXPECTATIONS FOR SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ARE
HIGH
Jurors’ expectations that the prosecution would present sci-
entific evidence were high in the Wayne County study, exceed-
ing the level of expectations that the data demonstrated in the
Washtenaw County study. In Wayne County, 58.3% of the
potential jurors expected to see scientific evidence of some
kind in every type of criminal case, compared to 46.3% of
Washtenaw jurors in our 2006 study.  A significant number of
jurors (42.1%) expected to see DNA in every case. This was
almost double the number of Washtenaw County jurors who
reported two years earlier that they expected to see DNA in
every case. Approximately half of Wayne County jurors expect
to see fingerprint evidence (56.5%) and even ballistics evi-
dence (49.1%) in every criminal case. 
Expectations for scientific evidence varied according to the
type of crime involved, but still remained very high overall. In
murder or attempted murder cases, jurors’ expectations for sci-
entific evidence were consistently high as to each of the vari-
ous scientific evidence categories. Over four out of five Wayne
County jurors in a murder or attempted-murder case expect to
be presented with scientific evidence of some kind (83.3%),
fingerprint evidence (84.5%), and ballistics evidence (83.9%).
Almost three-quarters (74.6%) of the Wayne County jurors
expected to see DNA evidence in murder cases.25 In rape cases,
the expectations for scientific evidence generally, and DNA evi-
dence in particular, were very high:  83% of the Wayne County
jurors were looking for some kind of scientific evidence and
88.9% were expecting to see DNA evidence in a rape case, with
only 3.1% saying they did not expect it and 4.8% being
“unsure.”26
Even in cases involving
less serious types of crimes,
jurors’ expectations for scien-
tific evidence seemed strong.
In assault cases not involving
murder, attempted murder, or
rape, jurors expected scien-
tific evidence of some kind
(55%), DNA evidence
(48.6%), fingerprint evidence
(54%), and ballistics (44.6%). In breaking-and-entering cases,
the expectations were scientific evidence of some kind
(56.8%), DNA evidence (31.9%), fingerprint evidence
(83.8%), and ballistics (28.8%). In any theft case, the expecta-
tions were scientific evidence of some kind (45.4%), DNA evi-
dence (24.2%), fingerprint evidence (83.8%), and ballistics
evidence (28.8%). In general, the expectation for fingerprint
evidence was high for every type of crime that was asked about
in the survey.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF CSI-WATCHING TO HIGH
EXPECTATIONS FOR SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
The data collected in the Washtenaw County study led to the
conclusion that these high juror expectations for scientific evi-
dence were unrelated to watching CSI or similar shows on tele-
vision. The study of Wayne County jurors reinforced, and
indeed strengthened, that conclusion.  A comparison of the
impact that watching CSI has on the evidentiary expectations of
Wayne County and Washtenaw County showed that watching
CSI affected Wayne County jurors less than it affected
Washtenaw County jurors. Thus, the metropolitan jurors
seemed to be less affected by the show than the suburban jurors. 
Watching CSI made a difference in the expectations for 21
of the 49 categories of evidence in the Washtenaw County
study, compared to only 13 of the 49 categories in the Wayne
County study. For example, watching CSI made a significant
difference in the expectations of Washtenaw County jurors for
scientific evidence in murder and rape cases, while there was
no such difference noted in Wayne County jurors. On the
other hand, CSI watchers in Wayne County were more likely
than those in Washtenaw County to expect DNA and finger-
print evidence in assault and breaking-and-entering cases. 
DEMANDS FOR SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AS A CONDITION
OF FINDING GUILT 
If the jurors followed the jury instruction they were given
about the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof,
the most rational and legally correct response to questions
about their probable verdict would be, “I am not sure what I
would do,” and almost half of the Wayne County jurors gave
some form of that response. The other half, however, were
willing to give their opinion as to their likely verdict both with
and without scientific evidence. The results were similar to
those recorded in the Washtenaw County study, and in most
Almost three-
quarters… of the
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in murder cases. 
Court Review - Volume 47 11
27. Compared to 21% and 16.2%, respectively, in the 2006
Washtenaw study. Id. at 354.
28. The Washtenaw results were very similar for circumstantial evi-
dence cases, with guilty and not-guilty verdict percentages at
40.4% and 6.5%, respectively. Id.
29. Again, the Washtenaw County jurors followed a similar pattern of
probable verdicts in murder cases. Id.
30. Shelton et al., supra note 1, at 362-65.
31. Cole and Dioso-Villa, supra note 1, at 1347 (discussing the “tech
effect” proposed in the Washtenaw County study).
32. Id. at 1348 (emphasis added).
33. THEODORE SASSON, CRIME TALK:  HOW CITIZENS CONSTRUCT A CRIME
PROBLEM 13-17 (1995).
cases the jurors still appeared
to give considerable weight in
the testimony of fact wit-
nesses. In the “every criminal
case” category, 28.7% would
find the defendant guilty
based on eyewitness testi-
mony even without any scien-
tific evidence, compared to
18.8% who said their probable
verdict would be “not guilty” in such a situation.27 On the
other hand, when the prosecution relies on circumstantial evi-
dence, the failure to produce scientific evidence of some kind
may be fatal to the government‘s case, with 41% of jurors indi-
cating a probable acquittal and only 9.2% indicating a proba-
ble guilty verdict.28 The willingness to rely on factual witnesses
did not extend to rape cases, where the jurors appeared to
demand scientific evidence as a condition of finding guilt.
When the prosecution relies on the rape complainant or other
witnesses, but does not present scientific evidence of some
kind, more jurors reported that they would find the defendant
not guilty (27.1%) than guilty (21.1%). When the prosecutor
does not present DNA evidence in a rape case, even more
jurors surveyed indicated that they would be more likely to
find the defendant not guilty, with 24.8% of the Wayne County
jurors indicating a likely verdict of not guilty as opposed to
18.1% indicating a probable guilty verdict.
In other types of cases, a similar pattern of trusting factual
witnesses, but demanding scientific evidence where the only
other evidence is circumstantial, prevails in the Wayne County
study. Even in murder cases where factual witnesses provide
testimony, but there is no scientific evidence, 36.8% of the
jurors indicated a probable guilty verdict as opposed to 18.2%
who indicated a probable not-guilty verdict. In murder cases
with factual witnesses, jurors were also less likely to demand
DNA evidence, with 38.4% indicating a probable guilty verdict
without DNA compared to 12.2% indicating a not-guilty ver-
dict. When the prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence
in a murder case and fails to introduce scientific evidence,
however, those ratios reversed and 36.1% of the jurors indi-
cated a probable not-guilty verdict as opposed to 12.2% indi-
cating a probable guilty verdict.29
THE RELATIONSHIP OF CSI-WATCHING TO JUROR
DEMANDS FOR SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AS A REQUISITE
FOR CONVICTION 
The more pertinent issue regarding any so-called CSI effect
is whether jurors who watch CSI are more likely to demand
that prosecutors present some scientific evidence before they
will find a defendant guilty. The Washtenaw County study data
showed significant differences between CSI-watchers and non-
CSI-watchers in only four of the thirteen different crime sce-
narios. The data therefore tended to disprove the existence of
the CSI effect as described by prosecutorial anecdotes. The
results in the urban Wayne County study were even more pro-
nounced. In the same 13 scenarios, there were no significant
differences in the propensity or reluctance of Wayne County
jurors to find a defendant guilty based on whether they
watched CSI-type programs. 
EXPLORING THE “TECH EFFECT”
Having ruled out the CSI effect, one explanation for the
increased expectations and demands for scientific evidence by
jurors is the possibility of a broader tech effect. The tech effect
suggests that jurors’ increased expectations and demands are
more likely the result of the changes in our popular culture
brought about by the confluence of rapid advances in science
and information technology and the increased use of crime sto-
ries as a vehicle to dramatize those advances.30
After publication of the 2006 Washtenaw County study,
Professor Cole described the article’s suggested tech effect as an
interpretation of the CSI effect that asserts that “the cause of
changes in juror behavior is not CSI but rather the real-life tech-
nological improvements in forensic science.”31 Cole’s descrip-
tion is accurate but incomplete. In addition to the actual foren-
sic-science improvements that have occurred, jurors’ percep-
tions of those increased forensic evidence capabilities, whether
they exist in reality or not, also influence jurors’ behavior.
Further, even if the forensic science techniques that the jurors
envision actually exist, the local police or prosecutors may not
always have access to those techniques for budgetary, policy, or
other reasons. It is the perceptions of jurors about scientific evi-
dence that represent the real tech effect with which the crimi-
nal justice system must come to grips. An important part of that
coping process is the realization that the perceptions do not
arise from a single television show or even a genre of television
shows, but rather from far-reaching changes in our popular cul-
ture relating to science and technology. 
The tech effect, as Professor Cole accurately concludes, is
“not a societal problem.”32 It is not a problem in the sense that
it is inappropriate or wrongful, which is how prosecutors and
the media portray the CSI effect. It is simply a cultural reality.
In other words, the CSI effect should not be fodder for the
“faulty criminal justice system frame” that sociologist
Theodore Sasson describes as competing in the United States
for both the public’s and the media’s attention.33
The “faulty system frame” argues that crime stems from
criminal justice leniency and inefficiency as personified by
inadequate DNA laboratories. The policy solutions have called
for the criminal justice system to “get tough” and to emphasize
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the administration of “crime control” rather than the adminis-
tration of “due process.”34 As Professor Ray Surette has elabo-
rated, the faulty criminal justice system frame:
[H]olds that crime results from a lack of “law and
order.” People commit crimes because they know that
they can get away with them because the police are
handcuffed by liberal judges. The prisons are revolving
doors. The only way to ensure public safety is to
increase the swiftness, certainty, and severity of pun-
ishment. Loopholes and technicalities that impede the
apprehension and imprisonment of offenders must be
eliminated, and funding for police, courts, and prisons
must be increased. The faulty system frame is symbol-
ically represented by the image of inmates passing
through a revolving door of a prison.35
Hence, the rising expectations for scientific evidence are not
necessarily due to a CSI effect or a faulty criminal justice sys-
tem exacerbated by unrealistic juror expectations. On the con-
trary, rising expectations are grounded in a mediated tech
effect, which has become part and parcel of our criminal jus-
tice culture. The only issue stemming from this reality is
whether the criminal justice system will adapt.
JUROR FAMILIARITY WITH TECHNOLOGY AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Part of the basis for suggesting a tech effect is the idea that
jurors have become increasingly technologically sophisticated.
They use computers and consumer-level technological gadgets
daily and therefore have an appreciation of the power of mod-
ern information technology. From this appreciation, jurors
develop an expectation that the criminal justice system will
exercise that power as well.36
The data collected from the Wayne County jurors are
clearly reflective of survey data from the general population
regarding access and usage of the Internet. Such usage may
actually exceed some of the data about this issue obtained only
a few years ago. For example, the 2006 Pew Internet Research
Project revealed a continually expanding penetration of the
Internet into the lives of adult Americans.37 The Pew study
data collected in early 2006 showed that 73% of American
adults are Internet users, reflecting an increase from 66% in a
Pew study just one year earlier.38 Almost 87% of the surveyed
Wayne County jurors
reported having a computer
in their home, and over 40%
even have Internet access
through their cell phones.
Given the increased rate of
Internet usage documented in
the Pew research, the 87%
reflected in the Wayne County study data may simply be a con-
tinuation of the strong trends shown over the last several
years.39
The surveyed jurors also reported using modern informa-
tion appliances other than home or office computers. The
Wayne County jurors’ reported cell-phone usage was consis-
tent with the increased permeation of cell-phone usage that
has occurred in the United States.40 Over 92% of the surveyed
jurors have cell phones, compared to the 73% nationally that
the Pew Internet Project documented in 2006.41 In addition,
a 2009 Pew study reported that 49% of adult Americans con-
sider their cell phones to be a necessity rather than a “lux-
ury.”42
The Wayne County jurors help to demonstrate how tech-
nology and its associated gadgets have dramatically changed
our culture. As the Pew Internet Project described it, people
have an evolving relationship to cyberspace and all of its infor-
mation: 
[A]t a time when accessing online content no longer
necessarily means walking over to a weighty beige box 
and taking a seat. Lighter laptop computers and high-
speed networks (wireless and otherwise) give people
the opportunity to get digital content on the go and do
new things with computing—such as making a phone
call. More versatile “smart devices” make emailing,
phone calling, and downloading digital content possi-
ble with a very portable device. Pictures—photographs
and videos—can be created and shared almost
instantly, and Web cameras can put people in touch
face-to-face over distance in real-time using broadband
connections.43
While jurors seem to be technologically sophisticated, the
question remains:  do jurors expect that their local police have,
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and will use, advanced techno-
logical equipment? The Wayne
County survey asked jurors
whether they thought the
police in southeast Michigan
have certain crime laboratory
testing available to them,
including fingerprint compari-
son, ballistics analysis, hair or
fiber analysis, and DNA analy-
sis. They were also asked in what types of cases (every crimi-
nal case, every felony case, or only serious crimes like murder,
rape, or robbery) they expected the local police to use those
analytical technologies. Overwhelmingly, the Wayne County
jurors believe that their local police have the technology avail-
able to perform fingerprint, ballistics, hair or fiber, and DNA
analysis. For the most part, they expect the police to use that
technology in every criminal case. Almost half (45.3%) of the
jurors believe the police should use DNA analysis in every
case. 
The popularity of criminal justice programs and news
among the jurors surveyed also demonstrates a curiosity in
criminal justice issues. The Wayne County jurors indicated
that they have a fairly high interest in getting news about crime
and criminal trials. Almost 70% said they were either “very” or
“somewhat” interested in getting news about crime and crimi-
nal trials. The jurors were asked what sources they use—
including radio, newspapers, television, Internet, movies, mag-
azines, and books—to get news about crime and criminal tri-
als and how often they use each source. 
The study data showed that print media are not the pri-
mary source for news about crime. Television is the clearly
dominant medium for criminal justice information in popular
culture, with 68.8% of jurors indicating that they used televi-
sion to get such information regularly, if not often. Adding
jurors who said that they used television at least on occasion
for criminal justice information increases the cumulative per-
centage to 89.4%. Nearly half of the jurors in the Wayne
County study reported using newspapers at least often and
34% of the jurors used the Internet at least often to get crim-
inal justice information. 
Although the jurors primarily rely on television for criminal
justice information, that medium has recently undergone sig-
nificant changes.44 Access to a multitude of sources through
cable television has dramatically changed the availability and
type of information, including information about crimes, tri-
als, and the criminal justice system, in our popular culture. For
example, in 2008, more people reported that they obtained
their national news from cable television programs than from
traditional television broadcast network news programs,
although people continued to rely on local broadcast stations
for local news.45 Nationally, 89.1% of American households
have cable or satellite television access, while only 10.9% have
broadcast only.46 Wayne County jurors reported information
consistent with this trend, with over 85% indicating that they
accessed television through cable or satellite. 
Social scientists have long understood that characteriza-
tions of our criminal justice system in television and other
media influence jurors’ perceptions of that system. An early
explanation for this influence is the cultivation theory, which
communications professor George Gerbner posited over 30
years ago.47 He theorized that television programs develop or
“cultivate” the public‘s perceptions of societal reality.48
Indeed, he regarded television as such a strong force in our
society that he believed it was the source of our perceptions of
reality. Gerbner found that one strong message that television
communicated to the public was about crime and an overesti-
mated likelihood of becoming a victim of crime in a “mean
world.”49
Gerbner’s view of mediated images of crime and justice has
been expanded and developed over the past 30 years.50 The
modern issue with the originally framed cultivation theory as
a means of explaining the impact of popular culture on indi-
vidual perceptions of reality is that it is technologically out-
dated.51 Although television still may be the most important
source of criminal justice information, it no longer has the
overwhelming media impact on our culture today that it did
when Gerbner made his observations. Thirty years has turned
out to be an enormous amount of time technologically, as there
are many more types of media sources now than there were
then. 
Television itself has changed dramatically, particularly in the
variety of its offerings. But that does not necessarily mean that
Gerbner’s conception of the impact of mass media, and televi-
sion in particular, on perceptions of the criminal justice system
is no longer valid. The range of sources of mass media in gen-
eral, and the range of television sources in particular, is much
broader and diverse than when Gerbner formulated the cultiva-
tion theory.  But it remains true that portrayals of crime and
criminal justice on television impact the perception of law and,
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in particular, criminal justice in our popular culture.52 Today,
however, the medium of television is one of many more con-
veyance mechanisms for the messages about crime and crimi-
nal justice we receive from the media. Television, while still a
dominant media source, is no longer the monopolizing or over-
powering media influence in our society that it once was.53
The diversity of sources does not necessarily mean that
there is a concomitant diversity of themes about criminal jus-
tice that those media sources portray. The message that
Gerbner saw in the media about crime and the “mean world”
is still conveyed, but perhaps now by a much broader and
diverse array of media sources, including a more diverse tele-
vision medium itself. Cultivation theory is still valid, but this
theory now applies to a greater diversity or multiplicity of
media, including television. More importantly to the issue of
demands for forensic evidence, the same limited “faulty jus-
tice” frame of Sasson still appears to be a dominant theme or
message found in each and all of the media.
CORRELATING THE TECH EFFECT TO JUROR
EXPECTATIONS FOR SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
To examine the tech effect, the Wayne County study
assumed that modern technological advances would be
reflected in personal familiarity with the use of technology and
in various popular media, including television, radio, newspa-
per, or the Internet. The study also assumed that those who use
technology regularly or are frequently exposed to popular
media would be more aware of the technological and scientific
developments in forensics.
The jurors’ exposure to various criminal television pro-
grams showed significant relationships with their expectations
for scientific evidence. In “every criminal case,” for example,
jurors who frequently watched various criminal justice pro-
grams were significantly more likely to expect testimony from
the victim, circumstantial evidence, some kind of scientific evi-
dence, DNA, fingerprint, and ballistic evidence than jurors
who watched less frequently. In general, exposure to criminal
justice programs was significantly related to the expectations
in many evidence and offense scenarios. 
On the other hand, juror exposure to a variety of media
sources showed considerably fewer significant relationships
with expectations. In the “every criminal case” category, expo-
sure to various media sources for information about recent
crimes was significantly related to the expectations for testi-
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mony from the victim, finger-
print, DNA, and ballistic evi-
dence. Interestingly, however,
media exposure showed no sig-
nificant relationship with
expectations for any evidence
in the cases of physical assault,
rape, or theft. 
Juror access to and familiar-
ity with technology devices
produced findings in between the other two tech effect mea-
sures. This highest level of technology usage had a significant
relationship to evidentiary expectations in almost half of the
scenarios. The jurors with cell-phone Internet access, for
example, had significant expectations that they would see
some form of scientific evidence in six of the seven crime cat-
egories. 
Jurors’ exposure to CSI or similar dramas showed a signifi-
cant relationship with their expectation in less than a fourth of
the scenarios. As the suburban Washtenaw County study
showed in 2006, jurors who watched CSI-type dramas more
frequently were more likely to expect traditional forms of evi-
dence, such as victim testimony or eyewitness testimony,
rather than just strictly scientific evidence, such as finger-
prints, ballistics, or DNA. They expected victim testimony in
every criminal case, every rape case, and every gun case, and
victim testimony and eyewitness testimony in murder or
attempted murder cases. They also expected DNA and finger-
print evidence in physical assault and theft cases.
“MASS MEDIATED EFFECTS” ON ATTITUDES, BEHAVIOR,
AND EXPECTATIONS
Most contemporary scholars of mass media accept the real-
ity that both factual and fictional narratives help to shape the
beliefs, values, thoughts, and actions of the general public.54 In
fact, the dominant perspective within contemporary studies of
crime, justice, and mass media is that of social construction-
ism—the belief that reality is not only composed of objective
and empirically based knowledge, but also of information that
we acquire from social interactions of all kinds. Social con-
structionism has also adopted the commingling or blurring of
factual and fictional accounts as fundamental in shaping what
the public comes to regard as crime and justice.55 When it
comes to the mass media‘s effects on the public‘s notions of
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social reality, there are four
models that explain these
effects:  (1) the hypodermic
needle model,56 (2) the limited
effects model,57 (3) the minimal
effects model, and (4) the indi-
rect-effects model.58
The hypodermic needle
model, as the term suggests,
assumes that the mass media
has a direct and significant effect on the way people perceive
social reality.59 When it comes to the administration of justice
in general, or to the trial and adjudication of criminal defen-
dants in particular, this is the most superficial model of the
four. Even if it could apply to some aspects of people‘s views
on crime and justice, it has no application in determining the
outcome of a criminal verdict. 
At the other end of a media-effects continuum is the limited
effects model, which argues that, while individuals turn to
mass media for information, they do so not as a tabula rasa but
rather as people who have experience and knowledge from
other sources, such as family, school, and friends.60 As
Professor Surette maintains, people possess a social reality that
consists of both their “experienced reality” and their shared
“symbolic reality.” 61 As a result, the idea that all viewers of
CSI-type programs would take away the same lessons is an
absurd or untenable proposition to most media theorists. 
Somewhere in the middle of the continuum is the minimal
effects model, which argues that media effects are neither
direct or total nor insignificant or inconsequential.62 From this
perspective, media effects are more general in the sense that
they help to establish agendas by telling us what we should be
thinking about or what the important issues of the day are.63
Media effects also help us to frame discussions either themati-
cally, using data, trends, and context; episodically, using anec-
dotal, individual, and superficial stories; or both.
The fourth perspective, or the indirect-effects model, rejects
the hypodermic needle model.64 While the indirect-effects
model could be located on the continuum between the limited
and minimal effects models, it also shares some things in com-
mon with each of these models. As Professor Barak has previ-
ously argued, whether one is studying the interactions between
law and order, crime and justice, or violence and nonviolence,
one should simultaneously study the social construction of
these phenomena as they are mediated through mass commu-
nications and popular culture.65 For example, understanding
the construction of newsmaking criminology requires an
examination of the conscious and unconscious processes
involved in the mass dissemination of symbolic consumer
goods. To explain juror responses to forensic evidence issues in
criminal cases, we suggest such an indirect-effects model of
mediated adjudication and turn to that model in the conclud-
ing section of this article.
CONCLUSION: EXPECTATIONS AND AN INDIRECT-
EFFECTS MODEL OF MEDIATED ADJUDICATION
The 2006 Washtenaw County study and the 2009 Wayne
County study clearly demonstrate that jurors very much
expect to see scientific evidence in criminal trials. These high
expectations result in large part from what we have described
as the tech effect, or public awareness of and familiarity with
the powers of modern technology, coupled with their aware-
ness of the availability of that technology, as an important part
of the criminal adjudication process. This awareness comes
from a variety of sources, especially from mass media, includ-
ing television with its expanded offerings. CSI-type programs
are a part of that media environment, but they do not play the
significant role in forging jurors’ expectations that many have
attributed to them. 
Expectations are one thing, but demands are another. The
Wayne County study data also demonstrates that even though
these expectations do not originate in watching CSI-type pro-
grams, they also do not necessarily result in corresponding
jury verdicts. At the very least, there is no factual basis for the
strong prosecutor version of the CSI effect, which claims that
watching CSI programs causes jurors to wrongfully acquit
defendants; thus, the CSI effect is a myth. The tech effect, on
the other hand, is created by the mass media far beyond the
CSI genre; however, it still cannot be singled out as the sole
causative link to jury verdicts, either for convictions or acquit-
tals. The process by which jurors deliberate on criminal alle-
gations is far too complex and the impact of the media gener-
ally on those outcomes is far too diverse to lie at the foot of any
one particular cause. Instead, with respect to the importance of
scientific evidence, there is a multifaceted media impact on
juror verdicts. We therefore propose an indirect-effects model
of this mediated adjudication process. 
An indirect-effects model of mediated adjudication does not
assume a direct or linear cause-effect relationship between
criminal trial outcomes and any other variables—including the
CSI effect, the tech effect, and the mass media effect. Nor does
this model assume that guilty versus not guilty verdicts can be
correlated with selected variables capable of discerning, let
alone predicting, the behavior of juries, judges, or attorneys.
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Rather, an indirect-effects model assumes a reciprocal system
of mutually influencing factors where behavioral outcomes are
not overly determined, but may vary considerably, especially in
relation to the complexity of the criminal case. In other words,
a CSI effect, a tech effect, or a mass media effect, alone or in
combination, represents some of the more conspicuous social
features that may, in interaction with a variety of other cultural
and individual factors, affect the outcomes of criminal adjudi-
cation. 
Thus far, this article has defined the CSI effect and the tech
effect, and we have subjected these to a variety of empirical
examinations, including path and multivariate analyses, but
we have yet to define or test for mass media or media effects.
Of course, when we examine a specific dramatic series like
CSI, more general media sources like radio, films, newspapers,
the Internet, or various criminal justice-related television pro-
gramming, what we are actually examining are the various
groups of mass communication or what may collectively be
referred to as mediatized effects.66
At the same time, media effects also refer to the increasing
ubiquity and complexity by which the material and virtual
realities of crime and justice are mediated throughout evolving
technologies and mass culture. In a sense, then, we have also
tested media effects indirectly when we tested for the CSI effect
and the tech effect. While the data from the Washtenaw
County study and Wayne County study have indicated the
absence of a CSI effect on juror decision making and shown
mixed and overlapping support for a combination of techno-
logical permeation and criminal-justice-related television
viewing, any effect whatsoever is proof of a “mass mediated
effect.” Thus, in terms of the indirect-effects model, we assume
media effects as a given or a constant, and at the same time
conceive of media effects as having their own sphere in a tri-
angulated relation for the mythical CSI effect and the tech
effect as depicted in the accompanying figure.
With respect to the two spheres of the indirect-effects model
for which we directly tested (the CSI effect and tech effect), the
Wayne County study data revealed that, while there was a sig-
nificant increase in the expectations for the presentation of sci-
entific evidence by those jurors exposed to various criminal-
justice-related television programs, a much smaller increase for
those exposed to CSI-type dramatic programs, and an even
smaller increase for those exposed to various media sources,
those expectations alone did not necessarily result in juror
demands for scientific evidence as a prerequisite for a guilty
verdict. In short, when it comes to juror behavior and the
acquittal or conviction of criminal defendants, the CSI effect is,
in fact, a myth. However, like many other myths circulating
throughout the criminal justice system and society in general,
the myth may have real consequences.67
Prosecutors, judges, defense lawyers, and other law enforce-
ment actors firmly believe in the “strong prosecutor” version of
the CSI myth, so much so that they themselves, in collabora-
tion with the news media, manufactured the CSI effect.68
Survey research of prosecutors, defense attorney, and judges
demonstrates that 79% of these legal actors perceive that the
CSI effect is real and that forensic-based television programs
have influenced jury decisions.69 Similarly, research has also
demonstrated that, either based on their own perceptions of
jurors’ alleged behavior or by actually watching these shows
for themselves, prosecutors and defense attorneys have altered
their own behaviors during evidentiary evaluations, voir dire,
opening and closing statements, and cross-examination of
expert witnesses, among others.70 This has led prosecutors to
introduce “negative evidence”71 to suggest to jurors that the
pubic taxpayers cannot afford to perform scientific tests,72 or
to ask the judge to instruct jurors that the production of sci-
entific evidence is not necessarily part of the government‘s
burden of proof.73 Thus, the myth of the CSI effect turns into
a reality for the jurors at least insofar as it is reflected in the
reactive conduct of the trial actors.
Finally, in terms of an indirect-effects model of mediated
adjudication, the same research has supported a weak, rather
than a strong, prosecutor effect. Hence, legal actors’ belief in
the CSI myth has had real consequences and, in all likelihood,
will continue to do so, regardless of whether these actors learn
that the CSI effect on jurors’ decision making is actually a
myth. This is the case because it is not any one of the mediated
effects—CSI, tech, or mass media—acting alone that is the
actual cause, but rather some kind of relationship as illustrated
in the figure of our model. 
This leads to practical research and conceptual issues alike.
For example, one problem with the type of analyses that lay
the blame on one “legal actor”—such as defense attorneys,
prosecutors, judges, or juries in our case studies—is that the
analyses become overly determined by only one of four legal
actors that make up the adversarial system, when the legally
adjudicated outcome-reality is always the result of the four
legal actors interacting. Similarly, it is important that, when
examining the impact of other social forces (e.g., mass media,
CSI, technology), analysts should do so with the understand-
ing that these effects interact with each other, as well as with
other variables such as class, race, gender, education, and so
on. Lastly, when conceptualizing these interacting relation-
ships, the Indirect-Effects Model of Mediated Adjudication is
one viable way of conceptualizing these interacting relation-
ships.
Donald E. Shelton has been a felony trial judge
in Michigan for over 20 years and is an adjunct
faculty member at Thomas Cooley Law School
and in the Criminology and Political Science
Departments at Eastern Michigan University.
J.D., Law, University of Michigan Law School,
1969; Ph.D., Judicial Studies,  University of
Nevada, 2010; M.A., Criminology & Criminal
Justice, Eastern Michigan University, 2007; B.A., Social Science,
Western Michigan University, 1966. email:
sheltond@ewashtenaw.org
Gregg Barak is a professor of criminology &
criminal justice at Eastern Michigan University
and Distinguished Visiting Professor of the
College of Justice & Safety at Eastern Kentucky
University. Ph.D., Criminology, University of
California, Berkeley, 1974; M. Crim.,
University of California, Berkeley, 1971; A.B.,
Criminology, University of California,
Berkeley. email: gbarak@emich.edu
Young S. Kim is an assistant professor of crimi-
nology at Eastern Michigan University. Ph.D.,
Crime, Law and Justice, Pennsylvania State
University, 2001; M.A., Crime, Law and Justice,
Pennsylvania State University, 1998; M.A.,
Social Psychology, Yonsei University, 1993;
B.A., Psychology, Yonsei University, 1991.
email: ykim4@emich.edu
18 Court Review - Volume 47 
* This article is adapted from Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa,
CSI and Its Effects: Media, Juries, and the Burden of Proof, 41 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 435 (2007), and Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa,
Investigating the 'CSI Effect' Effect: Media and Litigation Crisis in
Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335 (2009). We are grateful to
Michael Risinger, Nancy Marder, and William Thompson for dis-
cussing with us various issues implicated in this article.
Footnotes 
1. Thomas Hughes & Megan Magers, The Perceived Impact of Crime
Scene Investigation Shows on the Administration of Justice, 14 J.
CRIM. JUST. & POP. CULT. 259 (2007).
2. This analysis will be published in a forthcoming article.
3. Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2529-2539 (U.S. 2006) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
4. See Harry T. Edwards, Address at Conference on Forensic Science
for the 21st Century at Arizona State University:  Solving the
Problems that Plague the Forensic Science Community (Apr. 3);
Harry T. Edwards, The National Academies of Sciences Report on
Forensic Sciences:  What It Means for the Bench and the Bar,
JURIMETRICS J. (2010).
5. Donald E. Shelton, Twenty-First Century Forensic Science
Challenges for Trial Judges in Criminal Cases:  Where the
“Polybutadiene” Meets the “Bitumen,” 18 WIDENER L.J. 309 (2009);
Donald E. Shelton et al., A Study of Juror Expectations and Demands
Concerning Scientific Evidence:  Does the “CSI Effect” Exist, 9 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331 (2006); Donald E. Shelton et al., An
Indirect-Effects Model of Mediated Adjudication:  The CSI Myth, the
Tech Effect, and Metropolitan Jurors’ Expectations for Scientific
Evidence, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1 (2009).
6. Maggi Newhouse, Real-life investigators indict “CSI” for perjury,
PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV., Apr. 13, 2005.
7. Jody Lawrence-Turner, Popular Shows May Sway Jurors, SPOKANE
SPOKESMAN REV., Jan. 27, 2008.
8. Ed Treleven, The “CSI Effect” on Real Juries, WIS. ST. J., June 19,
2005.
9. Flynn McRoberts et al., Fact or Fiction? The Jury Is Still out on the
CSI Effect, CHI. TRIB., June 5, 2005, at C3.
10. State v. Cooke, 914 A.2d 1078, 1088 (Del. Super. Ct. 2007).
11. Linda Deutsch, “CSI” and “Law & Order” Lead Jurors to Great
Expectations, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 14, 2006. 
12. Glenn E. Rice, CSI:  Courtroom Stalemate Increase, KAN. CITY STAR,
Aug. 10, 2005.
These days it still seems like everyone is talking about the“CSI effect.” Attorneys seem to talk about it all the time.The 258 different articles using the term between 2002 and
2008 that we found through a LexisNexis search are undoubt-
edly only the tip of the iceberg of media mentions of this sup-
posed phenomenon. Even academics are writing about it—
already a handful of books, several dissertations in progress, and
numerous scholarly journal articles detail the topic.
Judges are no exception to this phenomenon. A recent sur-
vey shows that most judges believe the television program
Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) has increased jurors’ expecta-
tions for forensic evidence, and many judges believe CSI has
made it more difficult to convict defendants.1 In an analysis of
318 newspaper and magazine articles discussing the CSI effect,
27 (8.5%) quoted a judge.2 Justice Scalia mentioned the phe-
nomenon in an opinion.3 Judge Harry Edwards, Chief Judge
Emeritus of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and Co-Chair of
a recent National Research Council (NRC) Committee on
improving forensic science, has mentioned the phenomenon a
number of times in his speeches about the committee’s work.4
One member of one the most prominent teams of scholars
doing empirical research on the CSI effect is a state court
judge:  Donald Shelton, Chief Judge of the Washtenaw County
Trial Court in Michigan.5 Allegheny County, Pennsylvania
Common Pleas Judge John Zottola says, “Jurors’ expectations
of criminal prosecutions have been altered by these shows.”6
Lansing Hayes, a Kootenai County, Washington 1st District
Court Judge, says jurors expect crime scenes to be “dripping
with forensic evidence.”7 Chicago Criminal Court Judge
Michael Toomin says the CSI effect “is definitely out there.”8
Others, like Prince George’s County, Maryland Judge James
Lombardi, call claims of a CSI effect “myths.”9 As one judge
summed it up:
[T]his Judge in a number of trials in the last several
years or so has witnessed defendants increasingly . . .
taking advantage of [the CSI effect] by asking witnesses
about tests they know were not conducted and contend-
ing in closing argument that the failure to test raises rea-
sonable doubt. They are taking appropriate advantage of
a different kind of proof expectations with which some
jurors come into the courthouse in the last several years
as a result of these programs. It would be naïve not to
recognize and acknowledge all of this. This does not
mean the Court finds that there is a CSI Effect but, in
fact, it means that there is enough of a possibility of it
that it cannot be ignored.10
These are serious concerns. If they are true, they raise seri-
ous doubts about courts’ ability to administer justice fairly.
Judges, in their dual roles as producers of trials and adminis-
trators of courts, would be the individuals expected to take
countermeasures to remediate the problem. These counter-
measures, however, would be serious indeed, and, in some
cases, might even challenge cherished practices of the
American system of trial by jury. Judges might, understandably,
be inclined to alter these practices only with great caution. 
A look at some of the popular and scholarly literature would
seem to suggest that judges should start taking action immedi-
ately. Media coverage shows remarkably little equivocation
about the existence of the CSI effect. Media reports declare that
“[t]here is no debating” the reality of the CSI effect,11 and that
“[t]he story lines are fiction. Their effect is real.”12 It is said
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that “TV is driving jury verdicts all across America,”13 that
“TV’s False Reality Fools Jurors,”14 and that “CSI Has ‘Major
Effect’ on Real Life Juries.”15 An online journal claims that
“[i]n many cases across the nation real-life jurors who are fans
of CSI has [sic] either caused hung juries or acquitted obvi-
ously guilty criminals, claiming the investigators failed to test
evidence the way CSI does on television.”16 A jury consultant
says that “[t]he CSI effect is real, and it’s profound.”17 The
accusations leveled at CSI border on charges of jury tampering:
one forensic scientist says that CSI is “polluting jury pools.”18
The impact of CSI is portrayed as irresistible:  a prosecutor
adds, “Jurors are so influenced by television . . . . that it
makes it nearly impossible for us . . . .”19
Not only is the media treating the CSI effect as a serious
problem, but justice system actors are as well. The FBI has pro-
duced a video about it.20 The Maricopa County Attorney (the
presiding prosecutor over much of the major metropolitan area
surrounding the city of Phoenix, Arizona) has declared that CSI
has a “real-life impact on justice” and has called on CBS to
insert a disclaimer on the program stating that it is fiction.21 In
addition to concerns about the integrity of the jury system,
some prosecutors have claimed that the CSI effect has altered
another pillar of the criminal trial—the standard of proof. They
have claimed that jurors are now holding them to a higher stan-
dard of proof than the traditional “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard. In closing arguments, prosecutors have called this
higher standard the “TV expectation.”22 Several legal scholars
have noted that, while the notion that forensically oriented tele-
vision programs might influence jurors is theoretically plausi-
ble, there is, as yet, no convincing evidence of such an effect.23
Legal scholars have further noted that, from a theoretical point
of view, any media influence on juries would be equally likely
to have an effect opposite to that most commonly discussed by
the media—that is, forensically oriented television program-
ming might just as easily make juries more conviction prone as
more acquittal prone.24 Legal scholars have also noted that even
if media influences jurors, that by no means necessarily trans-
lates into changed verdicts.25
They have also noted that no
increase in reported jury
acquittals has been detected.26
Amidst this uncertainty, what
should judges do? Should they
keep calm and risk seeming
complacent, or should they leap into action and risk changing
longstanding judicial practices in response to what may in ret-
rospect turn out to have been little more than media hype?
To help judges decide how to cope with this emerging chal-
lenge, this article seeks to provide a sober assessment of both
the CSI effect and what we know about it. It will begin by seek-
ing to define the CSI effect. It will show that media reports use
this single term to describe at least six distinct phenomena.
Some of these phenomena would, if true, clearly be damaging
to the delivery of justice; but for others the damage is less obvi-
ous. We will suggest that we need to carefully distinguish
which of these several “effects” we are discussing  when we
talk about the CSI effect, whether it is “real,” and what to do
about it.
Next, we will discuss the empirical evidence that currently
exists concerning the CSI effect, paying close attention to
which of the several aforementioned “effects” the evidence
supports. Given that the empirical support for the CSI effect,
as commonly understood, is fairly weak, we will then discuss
several alternative explanations for why attorneys, the media,
and even academics seem so eager to ascribe “reality” to this
phenomenon. Finally, we will discuss several ways in which
judges might be expected to try to control or correct for this
CSI effect:  voir dire, summation, presentation of “negative evi-
dence,” and the administration of the courts. 
I. WHAT IS THE CSI EFFECT?
The term CSI effect appears to have entered the popular lex-
icon late in 2002 in an article in Time magazine.27 That article
described “a growing public expectation that police labs can do
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everything TV labs can.”28 Even in this early article, the notion
of jury taint was present:  “This [expectation, forensic scien-
tists] worry, may poison jury pools . . . .”29 The term appeared
a couple of times the following year and more in 2004. In
2005, media coverage of the CSI effect exploded. A LexisNexis
search found 56 newspaper and magazine articles mentioning
the CSI effect in that year and 78 articles in 2006, the peak
year. This coverage included a cover story in U.S. News &
World Report,30 as well as coverage in leading science maga-
zines like National Geographic and Scientific American.31 Also
in 2006, the first full-length book devoted to the CSI effect
appeared.32
II. A TYPOLOGY OF CSI EFFECTS
The media and its sources use the term CSI effect loosely to
denote a remarkable variety of different purported effects.33 In
our earlier work, we proposed a typology of six different spe-
cific causal claims that we discerned in the media coverage of
the CSI effect, each named for the type of social actor who
tended to articulate the supposed effect. Table 1 summarizes
each effect. The perhaps canonical effect, which we dubbed the
“strong prosecutor’s effect,” is the claim that television pro-
gramming is altering juror behavior. Specifically, it is frequently
claimed that CSI has increased juror expectations for forensic
evidence in criminal trials. Because of CSI, jurors supposedly
expect to see forensic evidence more often and expect it to be
more probative. This, in turn, could lead to acquittals in cases
where forensic evidence is absent or insufficiently probative. In
other words, it is suggested that jurors are acquitting in cases
lacking forensic evidence in which they would have convicted
but for the creation of CSI and similar television programs.
Many prosecutors also make a weaker claim, which we
called the “weak prosecutor’s effect.” This claim posits that CSI
has altered prosecutor, not juror, behavior. Claimed changes in
prosecutorial behavior include questioning potential jurors
about their television-viewing habits in voir dire, presenting
negative-evidence testimony, discussing CSI in summations,
and requesting legally unnecessary forensic tests.34
Some defense attorneys advance an opposite effect, which
we called the “defendant’s effect.” The claim is that CSI and
similar television programming, through their positive and
heroic portrayals of state-employed forensic scientists,
enhance the perceived credibility of the government’s forensic
witnesses, thus advantaging the prosecution.
The producers of CSI, in rebutting charges that their prod-
uct is contaminating the criminal justice system, appropriated
the term CSI effect and reinterpreted it as an educational effect
on the general public. What we called the “producer’s effect”
holds that CSI teaches science to the American viewing public.
The “educator’s effect,” in contrast, claims that CSI is
attracting young people into careers in forensic science, much
as law programs, such as L.A. Law, have been thought to
increase law-school applications;35 medical programs, such as
E.R., have been thought to influence medical students’ choice
of specialty36 (and perhaps medical-school applications as
well); and the book and film The Silence of the Lambs has gen-
erated countless, mostly unfulfillable dreams of careers in
forensic profiling.37
Finally, some media sources posit the “police chief’s effect.”
This claim holds that CSI has educated criminals on how to
avoid detection. Examples of the supposed police chief’s effect
include wearing gloves and dousing crime scenes with bleach.38
It is important to emphasize that, of these six effects, only
three of them—the strong prosecutor’s effect, the defendant’s
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TABLE 1. THE MANY EFFECTS OF CSI: 
TYPOLOGY OF CSI EFFECTS FOUND IN MEDIA ACCOUNTS
EFFECT NAME EFFECT ON DESCRIPTION
Strong 
prosecutor’s 
effect
Jurors Acquit in cases in which
they would have convicted
had CSI never existed
Weak 
prosecutor’s effect
Prosecutors Compensate for
absence/weakness of forensic
evidence
Defendant’s effect Jurors Afford greater credibility to
forensic expert witnesses
Producer’s effect Jurors Know more science
Educator’s effect Students Attraction to careers in
forensic science
Police chief’s effect Criminals Adopt countermeasures to
prevent detection through
forensic evidence
effect, and the police chief’s effect—would constitute serious
problems for society. If jurors are acquitting defendants that
they would have convicted had the television program CSI
never existed, this would constitute a serious challenge for the
legal system. Such acquittals could, in some sense, be con-
strued as wrongful acquittals. Likewise, if television program-
ming is bolstering the credibility of government witnesses (the
defendant’s effect), wrongful convictions (in the broadest sense
of the term) could result. Either of these effects, if true, would
raise serious doubts about the integrity of the jury system that
forms the foundation of American criminal justice. If juries are
so sensitive to irrelevant influences that the current primetime
television schedule has a significant impact on their verdicts,
can we really sustain the dogged faith in the jury that remains
such a cherished principle of American criminal justice?
Finally, the police chief’s effect would generate perhaps the
greatest material harm. If true, the police chief’s effect could
mean that CSI is both increasing crime and decreasing detec-
tion of those crimes. However, it should be noted that the
police chief’s effect is, strictly speaking, a criminological mat-
ter not a legal one. If it were occurring, it would probably be
detected and addressed by police, not judges.
The other three effects, on the other hand, would not seem
to constitute genuine problems for society. For the weak pros-
ecutor’s effect, it would seem to comprise only a minor harm if
prosecutors feel compelled to change their voir dire question-
ing to include asking jurors about their television-viewing
habits. Prosecutors in cases with little or no forensic evidence
might use peremptory challenges to strike heavy CSI viewers
from the jury based on the supposition that such jurors would
require forensic evidence to convict. Likewise, defense attor-
neys might strike heavy CSI viewers in cases that rest heavily
on forensic evidence based on the supposition that such jurors
would be more likely to afford great credibility to the prosecu-
tion’s forensic expert witnesses. As discussed in the next sec-
tion, neither of these suppositions is necessarily correct. Even
so, litigants deploying their peremptory challenges in this
manner would not seem to pose a significant legal problem.
Similarly, prosecutors adopting the practice of explaining the
absence of forensic evidence at trial would not seem to under-
mine the legal system’s ability to deliver justice. Although it is
true that the ordering of unnecessary forensic tests could con-
stitute a drain on resources and add to backlogs at forensic
labs, this, again, is not, strictly speaking, a problem to be
solved by the legal system. The producer’s effect is posited as a
positive effect, provided that the educational aspects gleaned
from the show are not wholly unrealistic or inaccurate. So, too,
might the educator’s effect be
considered favorable if it
increases the quantity—and
thus perhaps indirectly the
quality—of applicant pools to
forensic-science-degree pro-
grams.39 There would seem to
be few negative repercussions
from the educator’s effect
beyond the disappointment of
some young people when they learn that forensic science is
neither as exciting nor as glamorous nor as easy as its depic-
tion on television.
In our earlier work, we cautioned that it was necessary to be
vigilant against what we called “hypothesis swapping,” in
which evidence supporting one supposed effect was used to
support claims about the existence of a different effect.40 In
particular, it is not uncommon to see evidence of the weak
prosecutor’s effect advanced in support of claims that the
strong prosecutor’s effect is occurring.41 For example,
Maricopa County Attorney Andrew Thomas released a study
claiming that jurors are reaching “conclusions contrary to the
interests of justice” because of “a significant CSI influence.”42
But, in fact, the study concedes that “verdicts have not yet
noticeably changed from guilty to not guilty.”43 Instead, the
study has merely found the weak prosecutor’s effect:  “[P]rose-
cutors have had to take more and more preemptive steps to
divert juries from reliance on television-style expectations.”44
Thus, evidence supporting the weak prosecutor’s effect is pre-
sented in support of the strong prosecutor’s effect.
Judge Donald Shelton has reinterpreted the CSI effect as the
“tech effect.”45 He suggests that any apparent changes in juror
behavior should not be attributed to television programming
but rather to the underlying real technological developments
that these programs depict.46 Forensic science and technology
have advanced enormously over the past century. Shelton
asserts that the cause of changes in juror behavior is not CSI
but rather the real-life technological improvements in forensic
science.47
Shelton’s argument raises an important caveat about the CSI
effect. If we are to take seriously the notion of a CSI effect, it
must be carefully disentangled from what Judge Shelton et al.
call the “tech effect,” the effect of changes in the actual capabil-
ities of forensic science. For example, if, as posited by propo-
nents of a CSI effect, we do find that jurors’ expectations for
forensic evidence have increased, we would have to assume that
this increase is caused by at least two factors. One factor would
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be jurors’ generally accurate
perceptions of actual increases
in the capabilities of forensic
science. The other factor
would be jurors’ inaccurate
perceptions of the capabilities
of forensic science as imparted
by CSI and similar television programming. Surely, for example,
we would not insist that jurors’ expectations for forensic evi-
dence should remain completely static. Their expectations
should be different today than they were, say, a century ago. In
the intervening years, numerous forensic technologies have
been developed; we would not expect jurors’ commonsensical
expectations for forensic evidence to ignore these develop-
ments.
Our point is that the baseline against which the CSI effect
should be measured is not a static baseline with no change in
jurors’ expectations for forensic evidence. Presumably, jurors’
expectations should, appropriately, increase over time, in
response to actual advances in forensic technology. The CSI
effect, if there is one, would have to refer to a marginal increase
in juror expectations that is excessive of whatever increase in
expectations we should reasonably anticipate, given the tech-
nological developments that have actually occurred. What this
means is that the tech effect, as Shelton et al. characterize it, is
not a societal problem. It represents an appropriate increase in
juror expectations in response to actual increases in forensic
technological capacity. Only the supposed strong prosecutor’s
effect of wrongful acquittals would represent a genuine prob-
lem for the legal system.
III. IS THE “CSI EFFECT” REAL?
Although the media coverage portrays the CSI effect as a
well-documented phenomenon, actual evidence of the various
effects is difficult to come by.48 Media accounts rely largely on
anecdotes and conclusory statements by various criminal jus-
tice system actors. Little reference is made to empirical data,
and when such references are made, they usually note the
absence of such data.49 A review of the socio-legal literature
reveals a rather different picture. Most legal scholars charac-
terize claims of the most common CSI effect—the strong pros-
ecutor’s effect which would lead to wrongful acquittals—as
speculative, and many suggest that the defendant’s effect is
equally plausible, even if mentioned less often by the media.50
In this section, we review the various forms of evidence that
have been mustered in support of claims that there is a CSI
effect, and we present some data on jury acquittal rates from
state criminal trials that indicate no significant change in
acquittal rates in response to CSI.
A. Anecdotes
Media coverage of the CSI effect relies heavily on anecdotes.
Perhaps the highest-profile anecdote is the acquittal of Baretta
television star Robert Blake from charges of murdering his
wife, in which District Attorney Steve Cooley called the jury
“incredibly stupid.”51 The prosecution provided evidence of
motive and opportunity, but forensic evidence was lacking. In
particular, Blake tested negative for gunshot residue, which
was inconsistent with the theory that he fired the weapon that
killed his wife.52 We have suggested elsewhere that the Blake
acquittal may be as indicative of a “celebrity defendant effect”
as it is of a CSI effect.53 However, numerous other lower-pro-
file anecdotes abound—cases in which juries supposedly
acquitted based on the lack of forensic evidence despite the
non-forensic evidence presented at trial. In one sexual assault
case, despite incriminating DNA evidence, the jury supposedly
acquitted because of the failure to test a soil sample from the
victim’s cervix.54 In another, a juror supposedly wanted a lawn
tested for fingerprints.55 Such media portrayals present anec-
dotal evidence based on journalists’ interviews with prosecu-
tors and jurors who claimed that the acquittals were in fact due
to jurors’ increased expectation of forensic-science evidence
and techniques based on the television depictions in forensic
programs such as CSI.56 It is possible that the jury had good
reasons for acquitting. For example, in reference to the Blake
case jurors, Professor Laurie Levenson remarked, “[i]t was a
reasonable-doubt case, and disagreeing with [Mr. Cooley, the
District Attorney,] doesn’t make them stupid.”57
B. Surveys of Legal Actors
The second major form of evidence cited in support of the
CSI effect is opinion surveys of legal actors:  prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and trial judges. These surveys focused on
the perceived impact of forensic programs on jury verdicts,
pretrial preparation, and trial strategy. Survey results generally
indicate that, according to legal actors, the CSI effect is real
and has had considerable impact on the carrying out of crimi-
nal trials.58
However, these surveys provide very little supporting evi-
dence for the strong prosecutor’s effect, which people typi-
24 Court Review - Volume 47 
48. See, e.g., Cole & Dioso-Villa, supra note 26; Tyler, supra note 23. 
49. See, e.g., Roane & Morrison, supra note 13; Lovgren, supra note 31.
50..See, e.g., Podlas, supra note 23; Tyler, supra note 23.
51. Julie Keller, D.A.:  Blake Jury “Incredibly Stupid,” E Online (Mar.
24, 2005). http://www3.eonline.com/uberblog/b49519_da_blake_
jury_incredibly_stupid.html
52. Houck, supra note 31, at 86.
53. Cole & Dioso-Villa, supra note 26, at 455.
54. See Andy Kravetz, “CSI” Making Impact  in Courts, PEORIA J. STAR,
Sept. 4, 2005.
55. See Art Aisner, “CSI Effect” Put under the Scope, ANN ARBOR NEWS,
May 18, 2007, at A1.
56. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 18.
57. Keller, supra note 51.
58. See Michael J. Watkins, Forensics in the Media: Have Attorneys
Reacted to the Growing Popularity of Forensic Crime Dramas?
(2004) (Thesis, Florida State University); CSI:  MARICOPA COUNTY,
supra note 21; Thomas, supra note 43; Monica L.P. Robbers,
Blinded by Science:  The Social Construction of Reality in Forensic
Television Shows and its Effect on Criminal Jury Trials, 19 CRIM.
JUST. POL’Y REV. 84 (2008). Dennis J. Stevens, Forensic Science,
Wrongful Convictions, and American Prosecutor Discretion, 47 HOW.
J. CRIM. JUST. 31 (2008).
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cally think of when they think of the CSI effect. Many of the
questions on these surveys focus on effects on legal actors’
behavior, not jurors’ behavior. Moreover, even when these
surveys do seek to measure juror behavior, they do so indi-
rectly. Rather than examining jurors about whether they were
influenced by CSI, these surveys ask legal actors whether
they think jurors were influenced by CSI. Thus, these surveys
measure not whether jurors were influenced by CSI, but
whether legal actors perceive jurors to have been influenced
by CSI. In some cases, the legal actors claim to have spoken
with the jurors; in others, they offer opinions about jury
behavior without having spoken to the jurors. In either sce-
nario, this makes for a poor measure of juror behavior, not
merely because it is indirect, but also because legal actors are
hardly unbiased perceivers of jurors’ behavior and motiva-
tions.59 Asking a prosecutor who has just completed a trial
whether a jury acquittal was caused by the CSI effect, rather
than by, say, insufficiency of the evidence, is clearly an unsat-
isfactory way of measuring whether the jurors were indeed
influenced by CSI. Thus, to measure the strong prosecutor’s
effect, it would be far more preferable to survey jurors
directly.
C. Juror Surveys
To determine and measure whether there is a CSI effect, sev-
eral studies surveyed jurors or potential jurors. In studies of
this type, jury decision making can be compared between
groups who watch CSI (and other forensic television pro-
grams) with those who do not.
Kimberlianne Podlas attempted to detect the CSI effect by
using a rape-trial scenario with a consent defense where foren-
sic evidence was neither provided nor necessary.60 She sur-
veyed 306 college students and asked them to reach a verdict
of guilty or not guilty, where the expected or “legally correct”
verdict for the case was not guilty. Podlas compared students
who regularly watched forensic television programs with those
who did not and found that there were no significant differ-
ences in their decision-making processes or the handing down
of “not guilty” verdicts. The survey results did not indicate any
increased expectation of forensic evidence by CSI viewers com-
pared to non-CSI viewers.
To test the effects of CSI on jurors’ expectations, Shelton
administered a survey to 1,027 individuals called to jury duty
in a county in southeast Michigan.61 Respondents were asked
about their television-viewing habits of crime dramas such as
CSI and were presented with various scenarios of criminal
cases and charges. Respondents were asked what types of evi-
dence they expected to be presented at trial and what verdict
they would hand down based on certain types of evidence pre-
sented by the prosecution and the defense. The results indi-
cated high expectations for
forensic evidence by all sub-
jects, and CSI viewers had
higher expectations of all
types of evidence (forensic
and non-forensic) than did
non-CSI viewers. Any dif-
ferences found between CSI
and non-CSI viewers were
marginally significant and
were counter to the strong prosecutor effect. Respondents’
increased expectations of scientific evidence did not translate
into a requirement for handing down guilty verdicts. For
example, CSI viewers were more likely than non-CSI viewers
to find eyewitness testimony valuable when reaching a verdict
without any scientific evidence. The authors suggest that the
increased expectations of forensic evidence might have little
to do with whether or not jurors watch forensic television
programs, but instead they may reflect a broader notion in
society of an increased awareness about technological
advances. Instead of a CSI effect, they posited a general tech
effect experienced by everyone.
Kiara Okita surveyed more than 1,200 Canadians about
their attitudes toward forensic science.62 Like Shelton, Okita
found that CSI viewers and nonviewers did not differ signifi-
cantly in their perceptions of the accuracy and necessity of
forensic science for investigating crimes. Indeed, in some cases
nonviewers perceived forensic science to be more accurate
than viewers did. However, Okita notes that even those differ-
ences between viewers and nonviewers that she did find were
so small that they were unlikely to be operationalized, say, by
producing different verdicts. As she summarizes: 
Regardless of CSI viewership, respondents’ [sic] appear
to consider forensic science, in general, to be somewhere
between accurate or usually accurate, and between some-
what necessary and necessary in determining criminal
guilt. Therefore again, contrary to the assertions of CSI
effect claimants, respondents do not appear to perceive
forensic science as completely accurate and always nec-
essary in determining criminal guilt.63
Finally, in a series of studies, Steven Smith and colleagues
found evidence of changes in legal professionals’ behavior (the
weak prosecutor’s effect), and found evidence suggestive of the
defendant’s effect.64 But they found little evidence supporting
the strong prosecutor’s effect.
D. Psychological Experiments
Another approach to measuring the CSI effect is to conduct
simulations of jury deliberations using mock jurors, usually
59. See Cole & Dioso-Villa, supra note 26; Tyler, supra note 23).(spec-
ulating that the CSI effect describes prosecutors’ attempts to
understand jury behavior).
60. See Podlas, supra note 23, at 455-61.
61. See Shelton et al., Juror Expectations, supra note 5, at 332-39.
62. See Okita, supra note 25.
63. Id. at 103.
64. See Steven M. Smith et al., Exploring the CSI Effect:  Is it Real?, If
so, What is it? Address at North American Correctional and
Criminal Justice Psychology Conference, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NORTH AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL & CRIMINAL JUSTICE PSYCHOLOGY
CONFERENCE, 2008, at 81, 83.
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college students. Although college
student populations are not repre-
sentative of actual jury pools, jury
simulations allow researchers to
conduct controlled experiments.
Kimberlianne Podlas’s second
study included 538 mock jurors
who deliberated in small groups
about two crime scenarios where
forensic evidence was neither nec-
essary, nor referenced.65 Podlas
tested for the strong prosecutor’s effect as measured by not
guilty verdicts or wrongful acquittals for each scenario. She
found no indication that CSI-viewing jurors acquitted in cases
that warranted convictions, nor did she find that CSI viewers
relied on forensic evidence to a greater degree than their non-
CSI-viewing counterparts.
While previous studies examined the strong prosecutor’s
effect of potential jurors acquitting defendants due to their
increased expectation of forensic science, Schweitzer and Saks
tested both the strong prosecutor’s effect and the defendant’s
effect—that potential jurors who watch CSI have exaggerated
faith in the capabilities of forensic science and give this evi-
dence more weight than it may deserve.66 Their sample
included 48 college students who were asked to review a tran-
script of a mock criminal trial where the key piece of inculpa-
tory evidence was a hair left at the crime scene. They included
testimony by a forensic scientist who performed the micro-
scopic hair analysis that identified the defendant, which over-
stated the probative value of the evidence—something that is
apparently not uncommon for hair evidence.67 Subjects were
asked about their television-viewing habits and their percep-
tions about the case and forensic evidence presented. CSI view-
ers perceived themselves as having a better understanding of
forensic scientists and their techniques than non-CSI viewers,
and they were more critical of the forensic evidence presented
in the transcript. Schweitzer and Saks interpreted this as indi-
rect evidence of an increased expectation of high-tech forensic
science perhaps consistent with CSI’s depictions of forensic
techniques and a tendency to find less high-tech or glamorous
techniques less convincing. Similarly, in a study of 140 college
students, Jenkins found CSI viewers more sensitive to possible
flaws in a forensic assay that was discussed in a mock-trial
transcript.68
E. Acquittal-Rate Data
Even if surveys and jury simulations did provide evidence
for the strong prosecutor’s effect, one would presumably want
to look for changes in the rate of jury acquittals in American
criminal trials before concluding that CSI is influencing jury
verdicts. The strong prosecutor’s effect holds that jurors are
acquitting in cases in which they would have convicted had
the television program CSI never existed. If this effect is
occurring, therefore, it would be expected to manifest itself
through an increase in jury acquittals following the advent of
the program. In earlier work, we examined data on the jury
acquittal rate in federal courts, and we found no discernable
increase in acquittal rates following the advent of CSI.69 In
fact, if anything, there appeared to be a decrease in the
acquittal rate after CSI. Were this decrease to be significant it
would support the defendant’s effect, the claim that CSI actu-
ally benefits prosecutors. Recall that in some legal scholars’
view this effect is equally theoretically plausible.70 Loeffler
supported this finding, determining that there was no evi-
dence of an increase in acquittals after examining the acquit-
tal rate of four large states.71 Looking at Canadian data,
Benoît Dupont also found no discernable increase in acquit-
tals that was attributable to CSI.72 Although overall Canadian
acquittals did rise after 2000, Dupont notes that acquittals
had been steadily rising for a long time before 2000, and he
concludes that CSI does not appear to have had an influence
on this trend.
We sought to carry this project forward by gathering
acquittal rate data from all U.S. jurisdictions. Over the course
of six months, we conducted Internet searches of state admin-
istrative offices of courts’ websites and follow-up contacts via
email and phone with state court administrators. We surveyed
all fifty states to determine whether suitable acquittal-rate
data were available. We were able to obtain acquittal-rate data
on felony jury trials from eleven states.73 However, the states
varied in terms of how long they had been compiling disposi-
tional data from criminal jury trials. They ranged from
Florida, which has such data from as far back as 1986, to
Kentucky, which began compiling data in 2006. There were
only eight states for which we were able to ascertain acquittal
rates both before and after the advent of CSI in 2000:
California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, New York, North
Carolina, Texas, and Vermont.
We compiled acquittal rates for all jury verdicts from the
felony trial courts of these eight states and the federal district
65. See Kimberlianne Podlas, The “CSI Effect” and Other Forensic
Fictions, 27 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 87 (2006-2007).
66. See N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The CSI Effect:  Popular
Fiction about Forensic Science Affects the Public’s Expectations about
Real Forensic Science, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 357 (2007).
67. See Margaret A. Berger, The Impact of DNA Exonerations on the
Criminal Justice System, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 320, 322 (2006).
68. See Gwen Jenkins et al., The CSI Effect:  Mock Jurors’ Sensitivity
to the Reliability of Forensic Evidence, Address at Annual Meeting
of the American Psychology-Law Society, Jacksonville, Fla. (Mar.
5-8, 2008).
69. Cole & Dioso-Villa, supra note 26, at 462.
70. See, e.g., Tyler, supra note 23, at 1084; Podlas, supra note 23, at
461 
71. Loeffler, supra note 26. (The states were New York, Texas, Illinois,
and California.)
72. Benoît Dupont, The CSI Effect:  Myths and Reality, Address at
29th annual conference of the Canadian Identification Society
(2006).
73. These eleven states were California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois,
Kentucky, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, and Vermont.
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courts.74 In most cases, these were restricted to felony trials,
although the types of crimes were not designated in this data.
In one case, the acquittal rates include a small number of mis-
demeanors because the felony trial courts (the California
Superior Courts) adjudicate a small number of misdemeanors
as well as felonies.75 Although data on jury verdicts in misde-
meanor trials were available for a few states (Texas, Florida,
and Vermont), we opted not to include this data in our analy-
sis because of the strong possibility that misdemeanor jury tri-
als differ from felony jury trials.
We were able to obtain data reporting the outcomes (con-
viction or acquittal) for all felony jury trials (plus a small num-
ber of serious misdemeanor trials from California) that went to
verdict for the states. We found that acquittal rates are fairly
stable over time although, not surprisingly, they fluctuate far
more in the two smallest jurisdictions. Indeed, the data show a
strong main effect of jurisdiction on acquittal rates. In other
words, each jurisdiction’s acquittal rate appears to be quite sta-
ble over time, and jurisdiction appears to have a far greater
influence on the probability of acquittal than does year. A
defendant would be better off being tried in Florida than in
California both before and after the advent of CSI, and, even if
there is a CSI effect, it would appear to be a minor issue com-
pared to the influence of jurisdiction.
Although there is no reason to expect that any CSI effect
would be felt differentially in different states, the various states
do not follow a wholly consistent pattern. Overall, there does
appear to be a slight rise in acquittals in 2001 and 2002.
Interpreting this small rise as the strong prosecutor’s effect,
however, raises several concerns. First, after 2002, the acquit-
tal rate drops back to 1998-2000 levels, suggesting that even if
there had been a strong prosecutor’s effect in 2001-2002, it was
short-lived (or prosecutors compensated for it and stopped
bringing susceptible cases to trial). Second, the acquittal rate
was already rising before the advent of CSI. The acquittal rates
of 2001-2002 might simply be extensions of this trend, rather
than reactions to CSI. Third, the aggregate acquittal rate in
1996 was as high as the post-CSI acquittal rates of 2001-2002.
It may be that it is the 1997
drop in acquittals that
requires explanation, rather
than increase that followed it.
At the same time, the trend
toward a drop in acquittals
that we noted earlier in the
federal courts appears even
more pronounced now that
we have data for two addi-
tional years. Whereas in our
prior study we found a drop to an 11% federal acquittal rate in
2005, we now see that the acquittal rate has remained at this
historically low rate for three consecutive years. 
In short, the acquittal-rate data would seem to offer only
equivocal support for only a very small and short-lived strong
prosecutor’s effect. Can we conclude anything more definitive
from this data? How to deal with time-series data of this sort is
not obvious. For instance, it is not clear whether the pre-CSI
acquittal rate should be treated as the acquittal rate for 2000,
the year immediately preceding the advent of the program, or
the aggregate acquittal rate of a greater range of years, such as
1997-2000. Similarly, it is not clear how best to account for
temporal trends in the acquittal rate that preceded the advent
of CSI. We were not able to find any studies that attempt to
model changes in jury verdicts in response to a historical
event. Without any such study in hand upon which to model
our analysis, we conducted two analyses.
In the first analysis, we treated the acquittal rate of each
jurisdiction as an observation. This gave us a total of 132
observations drawn from nine jurisdictions between 1986 and
2008. Since CSI began airing in 2000, if CSI viewership had an
effect on jury verdicts, we would expect a change in acquittal
rates as early as fiscal year 2001. We also looked at differences
in acquittal rates in the following three years after the first air-
ing of CSI to account for the possibility of a lag effect in which
CSI did not have an immediate impact but did have an impact
after some years of media saturation. Indeed, one might expect
74. The sources of the data are:  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
ONLINE, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook; CIR.
COURTS OF ILL., CASELOAD AND STATISTICAL RECORDS, available at
http://www.state.il.us/COURT/SupremeCourt/AnnualReport/2006/
Stat/caseload.pdf; FLA. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADM’R, FLORIDA’S
TRIAL COURTS STATISTICAL REFERENCE GUIDE, available at
http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/stats/ reference_guide.shtml;
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., ANNUAL DATA REFERENCE FOR 1994-1995,
available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/ 3_stats.htm;
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., COURT STATISTICS REPORTS, STATEWIDE
CASELOAD TRENDS, available at http://www.courtinfo. ca.gov/
reference/3_stats.htm; N.C. JUDICIAL BRANCH, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
COURTS, CASELOAD INVENTORY BY COUNTY, SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL,
DISPOSITION ACTIVITY, STATEWIDE SUMMARY (courtesy of Mr. Patrick
Tamer, Statistical Programmer Analyst, Research and Planning
Div., N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts); OFFICE OF CT. ADM’R,
ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY, available at
http://www.courts.state.tx.us/pubs/annual-reports.asp; STATE OF
HAW., JUDICIARY, OFFICE OF THE ADMIN. DIR., STATEWIDE CIR. CT.
CRIM. (on file with STAN. L. REV.); STATE OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE
CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS, available at http://www.
courts.state.ny.us/reports/annual; STATE OF VERMONT SUP. CT.,
JUDICIAL STATISTICS (2000) (on file with STAN. L. REV.); STATE OF VT.
SUP. CT., JUDICIAL STATISTICS (1999) (on file with STAN. L. REV.);
STATE OF VT. SUP. CT., JUDICIAL STATISTICS (1998) (on file with the
STAN. L. REV.); VT. JUDICIARY, ANNUAL STATISTICS, DIST. CT., available
at http://www.vermontjudiciary.org/Statistics/default.aspx.
75. The California data do not allow the removal of misdemeanors
because, although convictions are broken out into felonies and
misdemeanors, acquittals are aggregated. We do not feel that the
inclusion of a small number of California misdemeanors in the
felony data is likely to substantially distort our findings. To give
some idea of what we mean by a “small number” of misde-
meanors:  in 2007, misdemeanors accounted for 4.5% of all con-
victions recorded by the California Superior Courts. See JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CAL., COURT STATISTICS REPORTS, STATEWIDE CASELOAD
TRENDS (2008), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/
reference/documents/csr2008.pdf
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that the CSI effect would be
felt after a large number of
aggregate exposures to CSI
and similar programs. Linear
regressions of acquittal rates
before and after 2000, after
the first airing of CSI, found
no statistically significant dif-
ference.76 When we tested
before and after the years
2001, 2002 and 2003, we also found no statistically significant
difference in acquittal rates before and after any of these years.
These results suggest that the changes in acquittal rates fol-
lowing the introduction of CSI are very likely the result of
chance, and, certainly, the possibility that they are due to
chance cannot be ruled out.
One disadvantage of Analysis 1 is that it treats each state’s
annual acquittal rate as a single observation. But such obser-
vations refer to a great many more trials in the case of
California than in the case of Vermont. Analysis 2 overcomes
that disadvantage by treating each trial that went to a jury ver-
dict as an observation. In other words, we treated our data as
if it was a random sample of American jury verdicts.77 States
were irrelevant in this analysis, except as a means of obtaining
a sample of American jury verdicts. We found a statistically
significant increase in acquittal rates from the years pre-CSI to
post-2001 and post-2002, but not post-2003. As discussed
above, there are a number of plausible explanations for this
increase in addition to a two-year CSI effect. One is that this
increase in acquittal rates post-CSI may be attributed to the
general trend of rising acquittal rates beginning in 1997 and
may not be attributable to any CSI effect. Indeed, we also
found a statistically significant increase in acquittals between
1997-1999 and 2000, the year before CSI went on the air.
Similarly, if we compared just 2000, the one year prior to CSI,
to the post-CSI years, there was no longer a significant increase
in acquittal rates; and in the case of one comparison, there was
a statistically significant decrease in the proportion of acquit-
tals.
Another possibility is that two or more different CSI effects
may be canceling each other out. For instance, the strong
prosecutor’s effect and the defendant’s effect might both be
occurring and canceling one another out, one driving acquit-
tals up, the other driving them down. Or, the strong prosecu-
tor’s effect may be occurring, but prosecutors may be com-
pensating by not bringing the affected cases to trial, by effec-
tively screening out jurors affected by it in voir dire, or by
effectively explaining the absence or weakness of forensic evi-
dence. Under such a scenario, the CSI effect would be occur-
ring, but it would not be detected in acquittal rates. In a sense,
the strong prosecutor’s effect would be canceled by the weak
prosecutor’s effect. Or, unknown other historical changes for
which we have not accounted may have affected the acquittal
rate during the period we analyzed and may have counter-
acted the CSI effect. For example, the September 11, 2001
attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon comes to
mind as an event that falls within the period of analysis that
might have conceivably had an impact on acquittal rates.
Similarly, a major legal change—such as a landmark Supreme
Court ruling on evidence law—might shift acquittal rates,
although we are not aware of such a decision during the rele-
vant period. In sum, given the equivocal nature of the data
and the relatively small changes in acquittal rates, existing
acquittal-rate data would not seem to warrant panic about the
existence of a CSI effect.
IV. ALTERNATE EXPLANATIONS
In short, there is very little evidence at this time that there
is any CSI effect. Why then does the problem receive so much
media attention that treats the phenomenon as a serious prob-
lem for the judicial system? One obvious possibility is that it is
nothing more than a media phenomenon. Sociologists have
long noted the existence of “media panics,” in which the media
exaggerates the danger of some supposed social problems.78 In
the case of the CSI effect, such an interpretation is particularly
interesting because it is the media itself that generates the
social phenomenon that is problematized.
Another obvious interpretation is that the CSI effect
amounts to “sour grapes” by prosecutors. As the acquittal data
shows, prosecutors are not accustomed to losing jury trials. To
a prosecutor surprised, or just disappointed, by an acquittal,
the CSI effect presents a ready, appealing explanation. The
Thomas study smacks of this notion. What prosecutor who
lost a conviction would not avail herself of the CSI effect as an
explanation? Cooley’s response to the Blake acquittal also
evokes the “sour grapes” hypothesis. Professor Levenson
remarked, “[i]t was a reasonable-doubt case, and disagreeing
with Mr. Cooley doesn’t make [the jury] stupid.”79 Professor
Scheck argued that the Blake acquittal reflected an absence of
evidence, not the CSI effect.80 Ms. Nethercott has suggested
that what prosecutors call the CSI effect might be viewed sim-
ply as punishment for failure to test relevant evidence.81 At
least one prosecutor, however, has denied the “sour grapes”
hypothesis.82
76. For further details on these analyses, see Simon A. Cole & Rachel
Dioso-Villa, Investigating the “CSI Effect” Effect:  Media and
Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335, 1359
(2009).
77. Strictly speaking, our sample was not random. It was a conve-
nience sample dictated by which states compile acquittal-rate
data. Nonetheless, we think it is still appropriate to treat the sam-
ple as random because we did not exercise any choice in selecting
which states would supply the sample data.
78. See, e.g., STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS (1972);
ERICH GOODE & NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL PANICS (1994);
PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD
MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA (1998). 
79. Keller, supra note 51.
80. Andrew Blankstein & Jean Guccione, “CSI” Effect or Just Flimsy
Evidence? The Jury Is Out, L.A. TIMES, March 18, 2005, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/mar/18/local/me-jurors18.
81. Jamie Stockwell, Defense, Prosecution Play to New “CSI” Savvy,
WASH. POST, May 22, 2005, at A1; Kravetz, supra note 54. 
82. Kravetz, supra note  54.
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Professor Tyler favors “media panic” and “sour grapes”
explanations:
The CSI effect is probably most important as an example
of the way that a broad consensus about the existence of
a legally relevant “fact” can emerge out of unsystematic
and untested anecdotal observations, in this case by
prosecutors and other court observers seeking to explain
acquittals that they find puzzling.83
A third interpretation is that both prosecutors and defense
attorneys, true to the adversary system, are engaging in strate-
gic gamesmanship to try to tilt the playing field for the next
trial. This puts the weak prosecutor’s effect, which claims that
it is necessary to address CSI in voir dire, in a new light. Voir
dire, obviously, has functions other than choosing jurors, such
as influencing the jury.84 Both sides may be seen as trying to
influence the jury pool by getting the media to propagate the
story that their side is being increasingly disadvantaged by the
CSI effect. In other words, litigators seek to benefit from media
stories that claim that the other side has been unfairly benefited
by television programming. We might call this the “CSI effect
effect,” the effect of media about the CSI effect on criminal tri-
als. If this is indeed the case, it is the prosecutors who have been
spectacularly successful. They have turned a television show
that may well enhance the credibility of forensic evidence into a
perceived liability, convinced the media that prosecutors are
now unfairly disadvantaged in the typical U.S. criminal trial,
and turned the acquittals into an apparent social problem.
V. WHAT CAN JUDGES DO?
Whether the CSI effect is real or not, however, many actors
in the criminal justice system, such as attorneys, expert wit-
nesses, and now, due to media coverage of the CSI effect, even
jurors themselves, believe it is real, and, therefore judges are
going to have to confront it. State trial court judges have sev-
eral ways to confront the CSI effect.
1. Voir Dire. There are numerous anecdotal reports of attorneys,
or even judges,85 asking jurors whether they watch CSI or other
forensic-themed media and of statements in voir dire to the
effect of “[y]ou do realize that most of that stuff on ‘CSI’ is made
up?”86 Should judges permit such questioning? Judge Shelton
argues that questioning jurors
about television-viewing habits is
“certainly proper.”87 However, it
is well understood that judges
must remain vigilant to ensure
that probing for bias does not
bleed over into improper efforts
to influence the jury.88 Indeed,
attorneys acknowledge, and in some cases even openly recom-
mend, using voir dire as “an opportunity to influence jurors”89
or for “legal” or “factual indoctrination.”90 “Questions” about
the CSI effect that are actually statements, like that cited above,
would seem to bear a great risk of crossing that line. Judges
would probably be well advised to preclude attorneys from mak-
ing declarative statements during voir dire about the supposed
“true” capabilities of forensic science, versus those depicted on
CSI. First, it would be unduly burdensome to expect the judge
to police the verisimilitude of attorneys’ representations of the
true capabilities of forensic science. Second, such statements
would seem to fall outside the goal of detecting prejudice.
Indeed, such statements may end up creating bias, rather than
detecting it.
It is also well established that attorneys cannot ask jurors to
“commit” to a specific verdict or a specific weight to assign a
specific type of evidence during voir dire.91 In some cases, lit-
igants have alleged that attorneys invoking the CSI effect have
sought to elicit such commitments. For example, in one case,
the following statement was made during voir dire:
BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY (voir dire): . . . [Y]ou
know, if you watch TV a lot, you probably get to watch—I
don’t know how many of you—how many of you watch
CSI? Well, raise your hand. See, there’s a lot of you. A lot
of you. It’s a very popular show. My kids love it. All right.
They’re older and they love that show. They like Law and
Order.
But, can everybody tell me that they can separate what
they see on TV from what you see in the courtroom? I
know that sounds like a silly question, but some people
go, oh, well, it was on CSI, so how come they don’t do it
in every case? All right. And I can tell you how I know, I
know CSI and Law and Order are make-believe. If you
flip the channel, you may see Scotty beaming somebody
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CSI effect. 
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else up, and that’s on TV. All
right? So, can everybody tell
me—and, again, this kind of
goes to the burden of proof,
you know, about what evi-
dence you have—and can
everyone tell me that they
will listen to the evidence
and not speculate because they don’t have, say, DNA or
they don’t have fingerprints and things you may see or
hear about on CSI? Can everyone tell me they can do
that? Yeah?92
In that case, the court ruled that this was not an improper
elicitation of a commitment from the jury.93 Indeed, courts have
generally viewed all discussion of CSI in voir dire as permissi-
ble, and courts have also denied Batson challenges in which CSI
viewing was offered as an explanation for striking jurors.94
2. Negative Evidence. There are numerous reports of increases
in the presentation of “negative-evidence” testimony in crimi-
nal trials.95 “Negative evidence” generally refers to evidence
introduced that is not directly probative of the defendant’s
guilt. Rather, negative evidence attempts to explain the
absence of forensic evidence to rebut or preempt defense argu-
ments that if the defendant were the perpetrator, their state
should have been able to find some (or more) forensic evi-
dence linking him to the crime.
It is difficult to see anything of legal concern for judges
about the presentation of negative evidence. In most cases,
such evidence would not be prejudicial, and it would seem to
be the prosecutors’ prerogative to present it. 
Negative evidence might, however, raise concerns about
judicial economy. The presentation of large amounts of nega-
tive evidence at a particular trial might greatly increase the
duration, complexity, and expense of the that trial, and these
increases might be exacerbated by the recent Melendez-Diaz
ruling in the U.S. Supreme Court, which may impose signifi-
cant logistical difficulties by requiring the coordination of in-
person appearances by a large number of expert witnesses.96
Likewise, vast increases in the presentation of negative evi-
dence systemwide could impose significant administrative
costs for the judicial system as a whole. Courts have generally
given prosecutors wide latitude to present negative evidence.97
One legal scholar argues that the government’s prerogative to
present its case as it sees fit probably compels the admittance
of negative evidence in most instances.98 However, a recent
psychological study found that, in simulated cases involving
so-called “date-rape drugs,” the presentation of negative evi-
dence “completely negated” testimony about negative findings
from tests for date-rape drugs.99 This suggests that, in at least
this particular scenario, negative evidence may be “too power-
ful,” in that it appears to erase all probative value from evi-
dence that would seem to have at least some probative value.
3. Jury Instructions. One way of minimizing the amount of
trial time expended on negative evidence would be to issue a
jury instruction. A jury instruction along the lines of the famil-
iar maxim, “the absence of evidence is not evidence of
absence” could render much negative evidence unnecessary.
Most jurisdictions require courts to use pattern instructions.
At least one state, Ohio, now includes a direct reference to CSI
in its pattern instruction.100 Although most jurisdictions
require judges to use the pattern instructions, some allow trial
judges the discretion to craft their own instructions. At least
some judges have exercised this discretion to deliver instruc-
tions aimed at counteracting the CSI effect. For example, “a
believer in the CSI effect,” Baltimore City circuit court Judge
Wanda Heard “created a new instruction specifically to address
scientific evidence. It explains what evidence is and also that
the state’s burden of proof does not require it.”101
Should such instructions be encouraged or permitted, or
should pattern instructions be revised? Professor Imwinkelried
concludes that there is not yet sufficient evidence to warrant a
policy decision to create pattern instructions to address the
absence of evidence.102 However, he allows that further
research supporting recent findings by Judge Shelton that
jurors are particularly sensitive to the absence of DNA evi-
dence in rape cases might warrant a policy of mandatory
instructions on the non-necessity of DNA evidence in rape
cases.103 A number of trial courts have given negative evidence
instructions testimony over defense objections.104 Appeals
courts have generally not treated the introduction of such evi-
dence as error.105
While the issuance of such instructions in jurisdictions that
allow judges the discretion to depart from, or add to, pattern
instructions would seem to carry very little risk of reversible
error, judges might still wish to consider the wisdom of issuing
such instructions based on arguments grounded in claims of a
supposed CSI effect. The “absence of evidence” problem, after
[O]ne state, Ohio,
now includes a
direct reference to
CSI in its pattern
instruction.
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all, predates CSI, and so do its remedies. Judges should con-
sider whether the existing reasonable-doubt instructions
already do enough to address the problem of absence of evi-
dence. Moreover, issuing such instructions may start courts
down a slippery slope:  by responding to arguments based on
perceptions of a CSI effect, judges may be inviting future
demands for instructions based on whatever “effects” attorneys
perceive from future media treatments of law.
4. Opening and Closing Arguments. The final area in which
judges may have to decide whether or not to allow references
to CSI is in opening and closing arguments. In a number of
cases, attorneys have used CSI as a foil to seemingly explain
the less-than-overwhelming nature of the scientific evidence in
their particular case. In one opening argument, a prosecutor
advised the jury:  “Now, keep in mind when you’re listening to
the testimony from the witness stand this is not CSI Miami, it’s
not Law and Order. Nobody involved in this case, no one in
this room is an actor. These are real people.”106 In another case,
in closing argument, an attorney argued: 
The one issue left in this case is:  Was it him? The
defense would say, well—and you know they will—
there’s [sic] no fingerprints of him[.] They didn’t print
the money. They didn’t find his prints on the note. In
today’s day and age, unfortunately, the police and the
State isn’t [sic] put to the same test that they wrote 200
years ago in the Constitution [in] which they said the
proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt. Unfortunately,
the test, of course, of criminal defendants now is, can
they meet the TV expectation that they hope folks like
you want. Can they meet CSI?
[Objection overruled]
[I]f they don’t have fingerprints, he can’t be guilty. On
TV, they would have found fingerprints. But this isn’t TV,
this is real life.107
Appeals courts have been divided as to whether such state-
ments constitute error. The distinction seems to hinge on
whether the claim that there is a “TV standard of proof” is
interpreted as belittling or reinforcing the beyond the reason-
able doubt standard.108
VI. CONCLUSION
Should judges worry about the CSI effect? While there does
not seem to be anything wrong with attorneys reacting to CSI
within the framework of existing rules and procedures, there
does not seem to be a good reason at this time to change exist-
ing rules and procedures. Judges should also be vigilant to
ensure that invoking CSI does not become “cover” for prac-
tices that should not be permitted, like improperly biasing or
eliciting commitment from the jury. Judges inclined to think
CSI warrants changes in existing rules and procedures might
consider two key points. First, as Judge Shelton argues, some
raising of juror expectations for forensic science is appropriate
given actual, not fictional, technological developments.
Second, changing existing rules and procedures in response
today’s media sets a precedent for similar interventions in
response to tomorrow’s media. If judges think the jury system
is so weak that verdicts can be altered by prime-time television
programming, we all have a lot more to worry about than CSI.
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In our daily work as judges every ruling is of critical impor-tance to the immediate parties. Most escape notice by themedia. But from time to time, we are presented with cases
where press and public join the fray. 
How do we address these cases? How should we address
them? High-profile cases certainly appear to differ from the
norm, if for no other reason than the extent of the pressures
they clearly impose on us.  But, at heart, do they really require
us to change what we do? 
I was presented with a high-profile case a little more than a
decade ago, one that the court on which I served and I both
chose to handle in a way that differed from our customary
approach. Despite all the apparent or superficial differences, in
the end I came to the conclusion that while a high-profile case
unavoidably requires varying degrees of logistical adaptation,
its substantive resolution is effective only if it is guided by the
very same principles we apply to our daily practice of the judi-
cial art. 
This is my story.
In 1999, the State of Washington had long had a motor
vehicle excise tax, the MVET, that provided the State with sub-
stantial revenue that it spread among a broad array of state pro-
grams, many of them entirely unrelated to motor vehicles.
Given the size and duration of the tax, it was understandable
that the public disliked the MVET. I was not immune to those
feelings. Several years earlier, I had bought a used car and
found to my frustration not only that the tax rate was high but
also that the basis for my specific tax calculation was twice
what I had actually paid for the vehicle. Even modest vehicles
could bring with them a tax tab that would add up to thou-
sands of dollars in just a few years. Despite repeated public
demand, the legislature had not limited or revised this tax. 
Enter the public’s solution to the MVET problem. Like a good
number of states, Washington has an initiative process by which
citizens can gather signatures to place a draft law before the vot-
ers. In 1999, an initiative known by its number as I-695 was
placed on the ballot. It was drafted to require a reduction of the
MVET to a flat $30 per year per vehicle and, at least as impor-
tant, to require that a public vote be scheduled and held before
any governmental entity could increase any tax, fee, or charge. 
I-695 passed with a substantial majority of the popular vote.
The law’s passage threatened significant cuts in public funding
for numerous programs. Therefore, as soon as the vote count
was finalized, the law was challenged by a number of public
and private entities, several citizens, and a public union. Suits
were filed in various counties around the state. 
All of these cases were consolidated and then assigned to
my court. I was not worried. It promised to be an extremely
interesting case. The lawyers were excellent. I anticipated high
quality research and briefing, accompanied by vigorous and
articulate argument. From a judge’s perspective, what could be
better? 
Moreover, because Washington caselaw directs that initia-
tives passed upon public vote are presumed to be constitu-
tional and cannot be held unconstitutional unless clearly
proved to be so “beyond a reasonable doubt,” I had immedi-
ately assumed that I would be likely to uphold the initiative.
That sanguine view, so reassuring on initial assignment, did
not last. As briefing came in, and as I researched the law, I
found the challengers’ arguments increasingly persuasive that
the initiative had transgressed clear constitutional limits.
Speaking personally, the prospect of holding a tax-cutting
initiative unconstitutional was a matter for profound worry.
Like most state judges, I was elected, and as a general-jurisdic-
tion judge in Washington I was subject to open election con-
tests every four years. Worse, 2000 was a judicial election year.
Worse still, the parties’ stipulated schedule called for me to
issue my ruling in March 2000, a mere three months before
anybody with a Washington law license could simply pay a
modest filing fee, register his or her name with the State, and
run against me. 
More than one judicial colleague suggested that if I were
about to find the law unconstitutional, I should arrange to
have the case reassigned to a retiring judge, who would not be
subject to an election challenge. As appealing as that proposi-
tion sounded on a personal level, I declined the invitation. I
feared that to do so would legitimately be seen by the public as
compromising the integrity of the judicial system. Citizens
could perceive any reassignment as proof that the judiciary and
other members of the government were trying only to protect
themselves and their income, that they hadn’t given and
wouldn’t give fair consideration to the public’s concerns. 
So, instead, I focused on the fact that I had already had a
good ten years on the bench, and decided that if my career
were to be threatened or even terminated by a controversial
decision either way, I would redouble my efforts to make the
ruling be as fair and as clear as I could.
MAKING THE DECISION ACCESSIBLE
With what I feared could be a premature end to my judicial
career looming over me, I decided that the first step had to be
giving the voters immediate and direct access to any ruling. I
had to compose the ruling to allow non-lawyer voters, even
those with no more than a high-school education, to have a
reasonable chance of reading, considering, and then under-
standing my reasoning. I wanted to allow them not only to
understand what I had ruled but to understand, and possibly
even to appreciate, why I had issued that ruling. And of course,
to do that, our court also had to find a way that the text could
be made physically accessible to the public.
Composition
How to explain to the public why I had to strike down what
they had voted for, if that indeed were my final ruling? That
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would not be easy. In my experience, parties on both sides stop
paying close attention to judicial reasoning as soon as they
know who has “won” and who has “lost.” Because justice suf-
fers if losing parties believe they have not been heard, I had
years before developed a practice when parties were present to
hear an oral ruling to start by reciting and then addressing the
losing party’s strongest arguments in an affirmative way. I
would try to acknowledge the strength of those arguments,
particularly those that were most emotive. Only then would I
give the explanation of why those arguments, as compelling as
they might otherwise seem, were legally insufficient; and,
finally, I would announce the specific ruling. 
Simply put, my general practice was immediately and affir-
matively to recognize the losing party (only rarely does a los-
ing party deserve immediate harsh commentary) and show
genuine respect for their position. Savvy court watchers came
to realize that in my court the first party to receive favorable
mention would often be the party who was about to lose on the
central issue. But the simple fact was that starting with the 
positives for the losing party would mean that the losing party
would still have been able to listen to much of my ruling,
rather than feeling shut out from the start. 
So I planned to start my written decision on I-695 with 
positive acknowledgment of the losing party’s overall position.
Nonetheless, however important it was to provide the losing
party with affirmative recognition, I still had to face the ques-
tion of how actually to write both the “what” and the “why” in
plain English. 
Drafting
As to the writing process, it was obvious that I should not
compose the decision as if it were a law-review article or an
appellate brief. As simple as that goal is to state, making that
choice would require a change from our normal patterns. The
style of legal writing that most of us have been taught, starting
from our law school days, is rarely clear. Trained as lawyers to
rely on precedent, we somehow seem to have become con-
vinced that we cannot think a thought unless somebody else
has thought it before. We preface each point with the citation
of cases or quotations, many of which, viewed honestly, are not
really on all fours with the point being argued. And as judges
we all know that when attorneys compose the briefing that
they submit to us at trial or on appeal, all too many of them are
driven by the misguided notion that simply increasing the
number of citations will impress us or a higher court to rule in
their favor. 
This prevailing style of legal writing interferes not only with
the flow of reading but also with the flow of reason. But
because it is what we are used to, we not only tolerate it, we
fall into the same trap. I wanted out of that trap. As my first
step, I adopted a practice already known to and used by many
trial attorneys:  writing and speaking as if I were explaining my
legal point to an interested, but not legally educated, neighbor.
It works for attorneys presenting to juries. It ought to work
just as well for judges explaining a point to the broader public. 
I then applied one more drafting technique. Once I had
completed my research, heard all the arguments of counsel,
outlined the issues, identified the principles compelling the
decision, and reached my key legal conclusions, I sat down and
wrote the decision straight through, in plain English, without
turning back to my outline, and without any citations. I sim-
ply identified questions, principles and rulings, trying to do so
as if I were talking with my neighbor. Only at the end of the
drafting process, after I had summarized the arguments, my
reasoning, and my rulings in what was as close as I could come
to everyday English, did I go back to locate and insert the few
necessary and central citations and quotes that I believed had
required me to make the decision I had reached. 
As a result, the text really did seem to flow much more read-
ily. Interestingly, only weeks later, after I had completed and
announced my ruling, whenever newspapers reprinted por-
tions of the decision (one paper filled two full-sized pages with
the entire text of my discussion from start to finish), case
names and formal citation references were always eliminated.
As a result, what remained on the newspaper page was in fact
the very same wording I had started with, which I felt allowed
my ruling to be more easily understood. 
Distribution
While my first task was to make my ruling intellectually
accessible, I knew that step alone would not be enough. I also
had to make the decision actually and physically accessible to
any person who was interested. Those of us who are trial
judges know that that simple concept actually points up one
major problem we all face:   then, as now, trial court rulings
were not generally published in books or made publicly avail-
able in advance sheets or other official reporters. And,
although it was little more than a decade ago that I was prepar-
ing to issue this ruling, the internet at that time had barely
been utilized in any meaningful or user-friendly way by most
state courts. Very few trial courts then had a public web page.
Our court was no exception. We had no system that permitted
legal professionals, let alone ordinary citizens, any internet
access to court filings and rulings. 
Despite these limitations, I was determined to find a way to
help the public and the media understand both the ruling and
the court’s assigned role. The parties had already stipulated
that, whatever my ruling, it would bypass the court of appeals
and be appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Washington.
Our Supreme Court did have a web page at that time, so I con-
tacted them. Because my ruling would be the very ruling that
the Supreme Court would be reviewing, they considered it to
be an essential element of the court’s record and the court’s
business. Therefore, and particularly in light of the under-
standably great public interest in whatever the tax-related rul-
ing would be, the Court agreed to have my ruling publicly
posted on the Supreme Court’s own website immediately upon
issuance. We arranged that I would electronically transmit my
decision to Supreme Court staff ten minutes before it was to be
announced in my court, so that it could be entered onto their
web page (not an instantaneous process in 2000) and public
access be enabled as soon as I had finished delivering my rul-
ing in open court. 
I should add here that, given the positive reaction our court
system ultimately received for establishing this sort of access to
a high-profile decision, our trial court developed a publicly
accessible web page within the following year. On that page,
we chose to include links by which the public and press could
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immediately access rulings in any and all civil and criminal
cases decided in our court that had a significant degree of pub-
lic interest. A decade later, we continue that practice.
Oral Delivery
Print and electronic media had been granted permission to
be in the courtroom and to record and broadcast the delivery
of the decision. Because we also expected large numbers of the
public to attend, we scheduled the hearing in our presiding,
and largest, courtroom. 
The question of what words a judge should utter in open
court is never a minor one and was doubly important in a case
such as this. Among other things, the full decision was too
long to be read out loud. In any event, delivering a lengthy rul-
ing orally to the TV cameras could easily be viewed as grand-
standing. On the other hand, entering the courtroom and sim-
ply handing out the decision, saying only, “This is the Court’s
ruling,” and then departing, would present a different and two-
fold problem. It could be viewed either as imperious or, alter-
natively, as a sign that the court feared and was dodging pub-
lic scrutiny. Further, were I to choose to speak briefly but
extemporaneously about my ruling and its reasons, I could by
a careless choice of words inadvertently and unnecessarily cre-
ate an appealable issue. With the complexity and significance
of the case, that was not an idle concern. 
To address these problems, I decided simply to read the
introductory text from the ruling, plus a summary paragraph
from each section of the ruling, so that every single word I
uttered in open court would match key portions of the text
word-for-word. Then, to facilitate public access and under-
standing, I also had these orally delivered excerpts from the
ruling printed up in advance, for delivery to the press and pub-
lic in attendance at the hearing; in the footer on each page we
printed in bold type the specific web address at which the full
text could be accessed. 
This planned public access went off without a hitch. When
the hearing was over, both the electronic and print media
repeatedly recited not only the key portions of the ruling, but
placed the web link on the screen on TV news programs and
on the page in print media. As a result, thousands upon thou-
sands of copies of the decision were downloaded on the first
day, and were thereby immediately available across the State.1
INITIAL PUBLIC REACTION
A ruling like this does not always face easy sailing. Not sur-
prisingly, once I had issued the ruling striking down the pub-
lic tax-cutting initiative, the initial response was outrage. It
was public. It was immediate. It was vociferous. Within min-
utes of my departure from the bench, the charismatic sponsor
of the initiative took the floor in the public section of the pre-
siding courtroom and angrily denounced my ruling to the
attendant television cameras as the action of a “king.” Many
members of the public slammed the decision. Many wrote
angry letters to the press and complained on call-in shows.
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Others sent letters and emails to me, with one threatening, “In
revolutions we hang people like you from the nearest lamp-
post.” Another citizen called repeatedly over several weeks and
left multiple messages on my court’s answering machine, gen-
erally at 2:00 am, ranting about my decision and talking about
how incompetent I was. 
Although the tenor of public comment actually started to
become more favorable in the weeks following the ruling,
those initial responses were vehement. Stated in its most posi-
tive light, the thrust of the most obvious and vigorously argued
objection was, given the fact that a majority of the public had
voted in a particular manner, and that we had a democracy,
“What is one man doing, overruling the vote of more than a
million citizens?” That is a commonsense question, one that I
had tried to address in the written ruling.
POST-RULING PUBLICITY
Perhaps not too surprisingly, the written ruling had not
fully satisfied those who asked that central question. In
response to their continuing inquiries and emails, our court
therefore also took a step that I would now either advise
against or would modify in a significant manner. Because of
the storm of immediate publicity, and the number of press
requests for further information, the court leadership prevailed
upon me to make myself available for press interviews. 
Up to that time, I had never interacted with any media out-
side the courtroom about any of my rulings. Electronic and
print media had long been free to attend in open court as long
as their presence or conduct did not interfere with a fair hear-
ing or trial, and they were always permitted to record and
broadcast video of court proceedings. I had planned to con-
tinue this pattern here, and to let my words and actions in the
courtroom speak for themselves, and not to speak with mem-
bers of the press on any aspect of any ruling I either was con-
templating or had made.
However, based on the canon of judicial ethics that encour-
ages us to fulfill our duty as judges to educate the public about
the law, I was asked by court leadership to meet with the press
and fill them in on the judicial role in situations such as those
presented by I-695. I agreed to meet with the press, but I also
made it clear to them that I would answer questions about my
training, and about the work of the courts and my work as a
judge, but I would not respond to any questions about the sub-
stance of the ruling or make any comment that could other-
wise relate to or affect the course of the appeal. 
Of course I knew that, one way or another, if I met with the
press, the central question about the judicial role in a democ-
racy (the role of “one man”) would likely be posed, directly or
indirectly. I knew that if it were raised or even simply hinted at
and I did not respond, or seemed to be dodging that question,
it would hang over the interview, confirming the doubts of
those who disagreed with my ruling and thought the ruling
simply to be the political judgment of an “activist” judge. 
After giving the matter careful thought, I felt I could address
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1. THE FUNDAMENTAL JUDICIAL MINDSET:  
They don’t pay me to be right; they pay me to be fair. 
In virtually every case, all sides coming into a trial or a hearing
think that they are right and are entitled to win. Their belief is often
informed by and founded upon all manner of non-legal and non-judicial
considerations. 
When our first goal as judges is to be “right,” we too are necessarily
more likely to focus on the end result and do the same thing the parties
do:  that is, to apply goal-oriented measures, or a predetermined position
on the law, or other preferences from outside the courtroom, and thereby
advertently or inadvertently predetermine the “right” result. 
When we try simply to be fair, then we have instead turned our focus
to the process rather than the end result. Ironically, trying only to be fair
causes us in the long run more likely truly to be right, at least in the eyes
of the law, in large part because we are less likely to have closed our
minds to a party’s argument or otherwise prejudged a matter. 
Adherence to process is at the core of the rule of law. 
2. APPROACHING THE DECISION IN A GIVEN CASE:  
The most important person in the courtroom is the loser. 
The best judges are, in a very real sense, non-judgmental. 
Our first job is not to decide; our first job is to listen. If we are care-
ful to show the losing parties that they have been heard and direct our
explanations to them, their attorneys and, in the long run, the parties
themselves, will more easily accept our decisions. 
The fairness of a legal system is probably best judged by the respect
that a losing party has for the process and for the decision.
3. MAKING THAT DECISION:  
Neutral questions and standards are essential to the
process. 
Pollsters know how to phrase a question to push the responder to a
desired result. Likewise, attorneys know that if they succeed in posing
the key question for the court, they are much more likely to win their
case. 
A judge’s duty is different. How do we, as judges, pose a question that
does not consciously or unconsciously predetermine the outcome? Can
we ask a question in the manner of a truly neutral pollster? On the other
hand, when the mere choice among several possible questions does effec-
tively determine the result, how do we select which question to ask?
What is the neutral principle of choice that we can identify for the par-
ties as explaining and justifying our choice between or among compet-
ing questions? As judges, we should take the time to explain to the par-
ties how and why we selected a particular question. 
But first, we can set the stage during oral argument by telling the
attorneys that when we ask a question in court, we want one of two
things:  either a direct answer to the question, or an explanation of why
they believe our question misses the mark. 
Finally, when trying to resolve difficult evidentiary issues that under-
lie a particular question of law, we can make a proper decision even
when we haven’t been able to figure out the answer to the question of
whom to believe or what facts to rely on. We can resolve factual disputes
as a matter of law:  when we have tried our best and remain unsure of
the facts, or determine that the evidence is evenly balanced, the party
having the burden of proof on that issue loses. I have found that parties
readily understand, and can even come to fully accept, that concept. 
4. CORRECTING FOR AND EXCISING BIAS BEFORE
FINALIZING A DECISION:  
How do we minimize personal pre-judgments and predilec-
tions? 
Writing and then issuing a decision is the final step. But even a fair
decision may fall short in the parties’ eyes if we have not demonstrated
fairness in our conduct in the courtroom, and even in our body language.
Moreover, all of us can be affected by human factors:  e.g., studies
demonstrate that good-looking witnesses are generally deemed more
credible than average-looking witnesses. We must ask ourselves and be
prepared to explain, why do we believe witness A but not witness B?
Have we really listened carefully to both sides?
And when we believe we have reached a decision in a hotly contested
case, but before we have announced it, it is often helpful to identify an
emotive factor that may relate to or be affected by a key issue in the case,
and then figure out a way to flip it—e.g., the gender of respective spouses
in a parenting decision, the ethnicity of alleged actor and victim in cases
involving race, the parties’ religious affiliations in a case involving the
establishment of free-exercise clauses. 
If we would still make the same decision after flipping that factor, we
are probably on solid ground. However, if our decision would change,
we’d better figure out why and either modify our decision or prepare to
explain why that emotive factor makes a difference on the merits. 
5. THE COURT IN A DEMOCRACY:  
The spirit of liberty is that spirit which is not too sure that
it is right. 
We should set aside any personal preferences or initial reactions we
may have to a given dispute and try to embody the philosophy of
Learned Hand:  “The spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too
sure that it is right.” 1
It is not enough to “know” that we have reached the “right” decision.
If we are too confident of the rightness of our own ideas or decisions, we
are much more likely to be dismissive of, and not to listen to, those who
appear to differ from us. 
When ruling on a private dispute, we must be able to explain our
decisions in a way that brings the affected persons along with us. And
when ruling on a dispute that raises larger public or political issues, we
must take care to explain not only the substance of our decision but also
why it is the court rather than the legislature or other governmental
body that properly decides the issue in that case or, alternatively, why the
court is not empowered to make the requested ruling because it is
required to defer to a legislative, executive, or administrative body’s
prior determination. 
Genuinely exercising and expressing a degree of humility can actu-
ally enhance respect for the court’s actions and rulings. 
1. Learned Hand, J., The Spirit of Liberty, Address, (May 21, 1944), in THE
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND (Irving Dillard
ed., 1953), at 144.
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2. The Supreme Court’s ruling is reported at Amalgamated Transit
Union v. State of Washington, 142 Wn.2d 183, 11 P.3d 762 (2000).
the question without talking about the substance of my partic-
ular decision but instead talking about the nature of the judi-
cial role. This was the exchange I had in a television interview
when the predictable central issue of a judge’s role in a democ-
racy was broached: 
Question: Because of your ruling, some people have
said that their vote doesn’t count. Do you feel like you
were in a no-win situation?
Answer: Not at all. I mean, this is a very reasonable
question for people to ask:  “What is one man doing? We
had a million people vote in the following fashion…”
I think the best way to explain that is to say that if I
am doing my job right, I’m not the voice of one man.
When I do a case like this, I study the Constitution, I
study a hundred years of decisions by our elected
Supreme Court Justices. So I think, properly viewed, my
decision is not my decision. This is not the voice of a
man speaking, but really if I have done my job right, it
is the voice of the law developed over a hundred years.
The press on that occasion did not try to ask further ques-
tions about the substantive basis for my ruling. Nonetheless,
given the pressures on media representatives, we all know that
that will not always be the case. 
I have therefore thought long and hard about how we can in
the future deal with inquiries that are fairly crafted, thereby
assisting in public education, but still manage to avoid the risk
of the ruling judge somehow tainting his or her ruling or the
judicial process. There are in fact several possible, and less
risky, alternatives that a court has other than allowing the judge
who issued the ruling to be directly interviewed—alternatives
that will still provide assistance to public understanding. 
We tried one such method in our court in a high-profile case
that occurred only a few years later. When a trial was being con-
ducted of a serial killer with nearly 50 murders to his name, and
lurid coverage was to be expected, we arranged for a judge who
had had no contact with that trial and who would be walled off
from any such contact (so that no inside information would
even inadvertently be shared) to be made available to the press
to discuss general court procedures and processes. And, in
order not to transgress the ethical limitation on judges making
any comments in a way that might reasonably be expected to
affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending or
impending in any court, or make any nonpublic statement that
might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing, all such
communications were agreed to be off the record. 
The process seemed to work well in that case, but there is
an additional and likely even better alternative:   given the
occasionally difficult interaction of public officials and the
press, it may make the most sense for a court not to have a
judge perform such a task but to arrange to have one or more
legal experts fulfill that educational role. It may be a court PR
officer, if a given state’s funding is adequate to allow it, or it
may be a professor, a litigator, a former prosecutor or defender,
or some other experienced and reliable legal professional. 
Whoever the chosen person may be, it is appropriate that
we carefully consider how to fulfill our duty to help educate
the general public about the role of and limitations on the
courts. That is, it is important that we not only identify what
our rulings are, but also explain why we can or can’t perform
certain tasks or undertake certain actions that the members of
the public may wish us to take, or why we are required to take
other actions that members of the public may oppose, and why
a court’s role in any given matter differs substantially from that
of a legislature or other policy-making body. 
FINAL THOUGHTS
After only a few months, the initial ruckus had died down.
The public’s reaction, editorial pages, and letters to editors had
all become significantly more positive. Of course, it probably
also helped that the state legislature had by then finally taken
action relating to the MVET. And in that more peaceful time, I
received another telephone call from the man who had earlier
left his repeated and hostile 2:00 am messages on my court
answering machine. His new message was short and sweet. He
actually apologized for the tenor of his earlier messages, and
then said, “I still think you are wrong, but I have decided that
you were doing the best that you could do.” 
What more can we ask for as judges, that a citizen who hon-
estly and genuinely believes that we are in error actually also
believes that we acted in good faith and were trying to be fair?
On the personal front, nobody filed against me, and near the
end of that year, the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed my
ruling by an 8-1 vote.2 I retained my position on the trial court
through 2004, after which I did choose to retire from the bench. 
What did I learn from all this? Like the great majority of
state court judges, I had held an elected position and had been
subject to open public contests on a regular basis. That level of
scrutiny can be a bad thing if it makes us fearful of public reac-
tion, and it can be even worse if it makes us pander to vocal
opposition or causes us to deliver the popular decision rather
than the decision that is required by law.  But, in a closely
related phenomenon, and in what is barely the flip side of the
coin, I found that being subjected to elections can actually be
a good thing if it makes us more attentive to how we explain
our rulings to the parties and to interested citizens. 
Robert Alsdorf served as a superior court judge
in Seattle, Washington, from 1990 until 2005.
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Initiative 695 was affirmed in 1999 by a significant marginof the direct popular vote in virtually all areas of the Stateof Washington.
Its constitutional validity and its reach are now being vig-
orously questioned. These legal challenges, which raise ques-
tions fundamental to a democracy, were filed in several coun-
ties by citizens and by public and private entities alike. They
have been consolidated in this Court for resolution.
NATURE OF THIS DECISION
The United States and its individual states have long been
guided by the adage that we citizens have a government of
laws and not of men. In accordance with this cherished prin-
ciple, court rulings must be made by reference to law and not
upon personal whim. A judicial ruling on the validity and
reach of a legislative act passed by an elected legislature, or of
an initiative or referendum passed directly by the citizenry, is
controlled by constitutional law.
Wherever we citizens fall on the political spectrum and
whatever our ideas on any given issue, we all agree that the
touchstone is the Constitution. For example, one citizen may
challenge a particular act or law on the grounds that it vio-
lates his or her right to bear arms under the Second
Amendment. Another citizen may contest yet another act or
law on the grounds that it violates his or her free speech
rights under the First Amendment. As citizens, we may and
frequently do disagree on specific policies. Nonetheless, our
agreement as citizens on a single point of reference, the
Constitution, keeps American democracy healthy and viable.
Depending upon the issue involved, courts are required to
refer either to the United States Constitution or to the
Constitution of their particular state, or to both.
Because this set of cases involved the structure of the
democracy established in the State of Washington, the ques-
tions presented for decision today are governed by our State
Constitution.
The Constitution of the State of Washington was drafted
in keeping with the legal traditions of the United States,
which find many of their origins in the American Revolution.
One of the central cries leading to the American Revolution
was “No taxation without representation!” Echoes of that
revolutionary spirit are found in the passage of Initiative 695.
However, there is a vital distinction which commands brief
discussion. The early revolutionary slogan expressed the sen-
timent that citizens wanted no taxation unless they were rep-
resented in the body that imposed the taxes. That is, we were
establishing a representative democracy. In a representative
democracy, citizens delegate authority to their elected repre-
sentatives—legislative, executive and judicial—to decide cer-
tain questions on behalf of the citizenry. A representative
democracy does not contemplate, let alone necessitate, a
direct vote of the citizens on every act of the government,
whether it be an act imposing, enforcing or collecting a tax,
or some other governmental act.
In contrast to the representative democracies established
after the Revolution, a direct democracy is one whose struc-
ture not only permits but requires a direct vote of the citizenry
on every act of its government. No state has such a govern-
ment in its purest form. However, in the early 1900’s there was
a strong populist movement in Washington and in other
states which sought to permit direct participation in the gov-
ernment when a sufficient number of citizens wanted such
participation. These populist movements established the right
of the citizenry in more than twenty states to more direct par-
ticipation by passing constitutional amendments that permit-
ted citizens to file and vote on initiatives and referenda. The
State of Washington is one of those states. As a result, the
State of Washington now has a democracy whose structure
has both representative and direct elements. Both elements of
our democracy, direct and representative, are established by
and are subject to the terms of our State Constitution.
The government of the State of Washington remains pri-
marily representative. The direct participation of citizens in
legislative activity is contemplated on those occasions when
the citizenry affirmatively so chooses, in keeping with either
the Constitution’s initiative process or its referendum process.
In order to deal properly with the constitutional chal-
lenges raised to Initiative 695, one must keep in mind the
distinctions between the representative and the direct ele-
ments of our democracy, and the manner in which these two
elements interact under our State Constitution.
Each of these constitutional challenges will be addressed
in turn below. 
* * *
Arguments may be made that we have a runaway tax-and-
spend government and that we need radical systemic change
in taxation or in other areas in order to make our govern-
mental entities responsive to the needs and the will of the 
citizens. Some citizens will agree. Some will not. Whatever
the wisdom of a particular proposed fiscal policy, the funda-
mental structure or system of our government can be
changed only by constitutional amendment. 
* * *
Because the timely filing of a referendum with a sufficient
number of signatures immediately suspends the operation of
the challenged act or law, the Constitution exempts from the
power of referenda all laws which are necessary to protect
public health and safety (i.e., the police power) and those
which are necessary for the support of the State and its exist-
ing public institutions.
The purpose of this portion of the Constitution is to
assure that the government can continue functioning despite
political differences of opinion. The reason for this limitation
is rooted in history.
* * *
If the Court redrafted Initiative 695 to require local refer-
enda but prohibit State referenda, as both [proponents of the
initiative] have urged, the Court would have rewritten the
Initiative and caused it to address a topic narrower than and
distinct from the loss of statewide MVET funding. That sort of
redrafting would be a legislative act, and not a proper judicial
function. 
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EXCERPTS FROM JUDGE ALSDORF’S RULING IN AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION V. STATE OF WASHINGTON
Footnotes 
1. For an excellent overview, see JOHN HOHENBERG, FREE PRESS, FREE
PEOPLE:  THE BEST CAUSE (1973 updated ed.). 
Often judges are uncomfortable dealing with the media;many feel that the risks of bad coverage outweighother factors. But when the public has an interest in a
case pending in our courts, there’s only one realistic way for
most of the public to find out what’s happening—through the
media. Most judges will need to deal with the media at some
time during their judicial careers.
I presided over two high-profile murder trials that drew
national media attention, but I was lucky that my background
left me comfortable with handling the media relations that sur-
rounded those and other trials. I majored in journalism as an
undergraduate at the University of Kansas, which has a top-
notch journalism program. I worked part-time as a radio news
reporter while in college. And I worked briefly as a press sec-
retary to a Kansas congressman. These experiences, combined
with the lack of a trained media representative on our court’s
administrative staff, made me choose to handle those tasks
from within my chambers—and often personally—when trials
in my court garnered media attention. 
With only one exception (which I’ll cover here), everything
went very well from my perspective, and I think also from the
media’s perspective. This article aims to share some of what I
learned. In addition, in preparing this article, I contacted sev-
eral of the reporters and news editors who had worked with
me while I was handling these cases. Their comments have
also formed the basis for the ten tips for dealing with the media
set out below.
1. Don’t consider the media as the enemy. That sugges-
tion came from Sam Atwell, the assignment editor for Fox 4
News in Kansas City. As he put it, “Our job is to inform the
public and to work with the courts to get that job done.”
Realistically, the media can’t do their job effectively without
help from the courts. So they naturally want to work with you
as much as possible. Having a good relationship with them can’t
guarantee good coverage, but a store of goodwill never hurts.
Even if a particular story has some bad sides to it, there’s a much
greater chance of balanced coverage if you have treated the
media professionally and provided as much access as possible.
One example from a recent non-courts news story comes to
mind. A story circulated about a potential NCAA rules viola-
tion by a major-college basketball coach. One day after the
story broke, I noticed a piece on ESPN’s website—quoting
anonymous sources—essentially giving the coach’s defense
and a plausible interpretation of NCAA rules under which the
coach might not have done anything wrong. By maintaining
contacts with the media members who cover their sport,
major-college coaches are able to get out their version of a
story when that’s needed. Judges have to be careful about how
we handle such matters, but the same dynamic is in play. 
From a broader perspective, all judges are united in our
belief that an independent judiciary is essential to the mainte-
nance of a democratic society. But history is replete with evi-
dence that an independent press is vital too.1 Despite this com-
mon role (one that is too often undervalued by the public),
many judges share the public’s skepticism about the media.
While there are some bad reporters—and some bad judges—
the media writ large protect the rights of the people in a vital
way. Judges should be willing to work with them as we sepa-
rately play vital roles in preserving our democratic heritage.
2. Set the right tone for your staff. Most judges will com-
municate with the media through staff, whether a trained pub-
lic-information officer, a person in the court clerk’s office, or an
administrative assistant. They will follow your lead.
Karen B. Russo, a producer with ABC’s Nightline, long ago
discovered how important this can be:  “Everyone associated
with the trial will look to the judge as an example, so if a judge
is open or accessible or even slightly helpful, most everyone
else will follow suit,” including security personnel and court
clerks. In the absence of the judge setting a tone of accessibil-
ity, she notes that staff may “be fearful of being ‘caught’ answer-
ing a reporter’s questions on innocuous subjects like, ‘How can
I send a fax from here?’”
Russo makes another good point:  “These small interactions
can make a difficult trial a more pleasant experience overall,
which allows us to focus on the real work:  understanding the
trial.” 
3. Have someone available for media to meet with in
person and to contact by telephone, even after hours. If you
want to make sure that coverage is accurate, media members
need someone they can check facts with. In addition, they
need someone to check with when there are questions (as
there often are) about when the courtroom will be open and
available, how seating is being handled, where cameras are
allowed, or any number of questions that will arise. The media
need someone who can be contacted by phone, email, or both.
One newspaper reporter told me that he has seen some pub-
lic-information officers “who act as if they are being bothered
when a reporter calls them,” and others who aren’t very well
informed about court proceedings. I’ve known—and trusted—
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2. A 1994 article from the American Journalism Review, which is
available online, provides quite a variety of understandings for the
term “on background.” Bob Woodward said it meant that he could
“use it all” so long as he didn’t identify the source, while a
Louisville newspaper editor said it meant that “you can use it only
for your own information, just so you understand.” See On Deep
Background, AMER. JOURNALISM REV. (Dec. 1994), available at
http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=1621.
that reporter for years, so I’m sure his account is accurate. It’s
important to us to get accurate coverage, and we can’t afford
having contact people who don’t want to be bothered or aren’t
willing to keep track of the information needed. Your only real
ways to check up on this are to see whether the staff you’re des-
ignating seems well informed and then to check with a media
member or two to get their take on it as well.
A frequent happening during trials is that the court—or a
jury—may work after regular court hours. In such cases,
unless you’ve provided a cell-phone number or some other
way to gain after-hours access to someone who can answer
questions, the media may be at a loss to report accurate, up-to-
date information. Particularly in today’s media environment, in
which newspapers and electronic media all must cover more
stories with fewer reporters, reporters can’t always stand by to
await a jury verdict. Work out in advance a way to promptly
get that information to any media members who have covered
a trial. These days, email is perhaps the most effective means.
You could even scan and send the jury’s written verdict as an
email attachment, which would help to make sure that it’s
accurately reported. (If you do so, though, you may want to
redact the presiding juror’s name if that’s shown.)
Sometimes court staff may not want to give out a cell-phone
number or be bothered after hours. Sam Atwell, the television
assignment editor, urges that somebody provide such phone
numbers, adding that “most members of the media will not
abuse them.” During the trials I held, media members had my
email address and cell-phone number, and we were easily able
to coordinate last-minute changes in the starting time for trial
or other matters. No one ever abused that by making contact
when it wasn’t needed, and most of the contacts were conve-
niently handled by email.
4. Find a way to provide information on background.
Sometimes the reporters covering your trial are experienced at
covering the courts, sometimes not. Even for experienced
reporters, though, they can most accurately report the story if
they can confirm some of the basic facts in some way.
Long-time Kansas City-area newspaper reporter and colum-
nist Bob Sigman told me that, although attorneys could pro-
vide information, the one source he trusted was the judge.
Judges who got to know him came to trust him. He told me,
“[I]t took some time because I had to prove the judges that I
was seeking only objective information. I found that once that
was accomplished, they felt comfortable talking to me off the
record.” By being able to confirm his understanding of what
had taken place, Sigman felt that he was able to provide a more
informed and accurate story.
One key to all of this is to confirm with any reporter a judge
speaks to personally how the information may be used and
attributed. I generally spoke to reporters “on background,”
which I took to mean that they could use the information gen-
erally but couldn’t quote me or attribute the information to me.
But there is no universally accepted definition of terms like
this,2 so you need to make sure—before the conversation—
that each reporter confirms that he or she will abide by your
intended ground rules. They key point is that if you don’t want
to be quoted (i.e., to have what you say appear in quotation
marks attributed to a highly placed source in the courthouse),
make sure that’s agreed upon.
What might you talk with a reporter about on background?
Judges differ on their views about this, and you must look at
the judicial-conduct rules in your jurisdiction because those
rules vary greatly. 
Rule 2.10 of the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct
provides that a judge “shall not make any public statement that
might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair
the fairness of a matter pending or impending in any court, or
make any nonpublic statement that might substantially inter-
fere with a fair trial or hearing.” In my view, if you are merely
explaining procedures or making sure that reporters under-
stand the rulings you have already made on the record in pub-
lic portions of the trial, you aren’t doing anything that should
interfere with a party’s ability to get a fair trial. The 2007 Model
Code is consistent with that view in its additional statement
that notwithstanding the restriction against anything that
might impair fairness of the proceeding, “a judge may make
public statements in the course of official duties [and] may
explain court procedures.” In addition, unless it would inter-
fere with the fairness of the proceeding, “a judge may respond
directly or through a third party to allegations in the media or
elsewhere concerning the judge’s conduct in a matter.”
Whether you have these contacts or someone else does so on
your behalf, the same rules apply.
I felt I was well served by helping to make sure that
reporters understood my rulings, once they had been made
orally in court or by written order. Most of the reporting accu-
rately reflected what had transpired and what my rulings had
been. By direct communication, reporters could also accurately
learn things like how late we might be in session, when they
could get in the courtroom, and how they could gain access to
view exhibits that had been admitted.
Only once did I get burned. One television reporter who
missed the start of court when I had ruled on something from
the bench came back to my chambers at the first break. I
explained to him exactly what had already happened in open
court (which I had also explained in the media room on back-
ground for other reporters who had been on time that day). He
went on the air that evening with something like this:  “In an
exclusive interview, Judge Leben told this reporter . . . .” I had
some email communications with him after that to explain my
displeasure, and I never spoke with him again. He was the only
reporter who was ever less than professional about these sorts
of things, and I would admit that I should have had a more
direct conversation with him about the ground rules since I
hadn’t worked with him before. I made the mistake of assum-
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ing that he would be equally trustworthy as the reporters I’d
already worked with from the same television station; I didn’t
make that mistake again.
5. Make it easy for them. Who doesn’t like for their jobs to
be as easy as possible? So if you’re committed to having a good
relationship with the media, why not think about what you
could do to make their jobs easier?
Let me give you one example. I’ve often found that witness
names were misspelled in the newspaper, but sometimes that’s
because the attorneys had them wrong and reporters took the
spellings out of the court pleadings. My court reporter always
checked the spelling of a witness’s name when that person took
the stand, but it wasn’t necessarily audible to media members
in the back of the courtroom or in a nearby media room watch-
ing via closed-circuit television. So we provided cumulative
lists of the spelling of all witness names at least twice each day
to the media who were present in person or who had signed up
for emailed information. (We automatically included all of the
regulars, which included assignment editors.) Most media out-
lets are now putting information promptly on their websites,
and having this sort of information accurately provided
throughout the day helps them to be accurate. In addition to
sending it out by email, we also put it on a dry-erase board in
the media room we had set up in another judge’s jury room.
In addition to providing witness names, we also provided
electronic copies of all written court rulings, and we some-
times provided transcript excerpts for oral rulings of signifi-
cance. When possible, I ruled in writing so that the record
would be clear, something that helps both the appellate court
and the media. And, of course, providing a good place for
media to do their work whenever you can is greatly appreci-
ated too.
6. Understand deadlines. Sometimes, journalists just can’t
wait until tomorrow. They have real deadlines, and with our
increasingly 24-hour news cycle, the pressures on them are
real. Try to have someone return messages in some way as soon
as possible, and try to make sure that the needed substantive
information can be provided promptly.
7. Communicate with the media as soon as possible
about key events. This goes hand-in-hand with understand-
ing deadlines. Time is of the essence to journalists. If you want
accuracy and the court’s side of things to be part of the story,
you need to provide it before the story is written.
If you have a big trial coming up, make contact in advance
with the media who are likely to cover it. Get the ground rules
in place, figure out where the media can work while they’re at
the courthouse, and designate a contact person for them.
If you’re about to issue a ruling in a case, you can advise
them that a ruling will be issued at a certain time. You can then
provide it to them electronically. (Of course, be sure you give
it to the parties in advance of that or at the same time.) Many
media outlets will post your written decision on their own
website, which helps to make sure that the public gets exactly
the information you thought was most important about that
decision. Of course, you’ll also want to make sure that your
written decision is written in plain language, not legalese. 
8. Don’t impose restrictions unless it’s really neces-
sary—and explain them when you do. Let’s consider another
example. Kansas City television news reporter John Pepitone
told me that he’d seen a recent trend toward allowing video
coverage of court proceedings but no audio recording of them.
He rightly noted that this has made his job harder:  “It’s already
difficult to hear what is being said in many courtrooms. When
I can record the sound, I can replay it so that I make sure I get
it right. To accurately quote someone is an important part of
our job, and I’m sure the court system wants us to get it right
as much as we do.”
I don’t know for sure what has led to this trend among some
judges, but I suspect that they’re afraid of having things picked
up on the microphones that aren’t intended to be part of the
record (like what a defendant might say at counsel table to his
or her attorney). Maybe other judges have had more of a prob-
lem with that than I did. When there was full coverage of a trial
in my courtroom, I had a “kill” switch to turn off the micro-
phones being used for the television feed when appropriate,
and the ground rules agreed upon in advance stipulated that
no conversations between the defendant and counsel could be
recorded (and that they couldn’t be used if they were acciden-
tally picked up). 
Whatever the perceived problem may be that has led some
judges to ban audio, I would hope that they might reconsider
the decision and try to find another way to solve the problem
that would still give the media audio access to most of the pro-
ceeding. That helps to ensure accuracy, as Pepitone notes, and
also provides equal and fair access to radio coverage. If no
solution other than banning audio can be found, however,
judges should explain why they have any rules that limit
access. Reporters shouldn’t be left to wonder why access has
been restricted. In addition, Pepitone’s comments suggest that
the judges who have imposed these restrictions haven’t made
either themselves or court staff available to discuss the ground
rules for court proceedings; if they had done so, Pepitone, a
good reporter, would have had some idea why this trend was
taking place. I would suggest that if the judges and media
members involved talked about whatever concerns are driving
these access restrictions, a mutually agreeable solution could
be found.
The same advice applies to the limitations on what you can
and can’t say to reporters. Explain those limitations, and
reporters will respect them. Two reporters suggested to me in
response to my inquiry that it can be quite helpful to have writ-
ten guidelines for your court about what the media can do and
what the limits are. That seems especially good advice since
you’ll periodically encounter reporters who haven’t been there
before, and even seasoned reporters can have trouble remem-
bering the idiosyncracies of courts throughout their coverage
area.
9. If you don’t know something, don’t try to answer. The
law is complicated, and none of us knows everything that
might come up during a trial. If you’re asked something pro-
cedural or legal during a background session with reporters,
don’t guess. If it’s something like the elements of the crime
charged, you can offer to get them a copy of the pattern jury
instruction. (Or, if you’ve given preliminary substantive jury
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3. THE DONALD W. REYNOLDS NATIONAL CENTER FOR COURTS & MEDIA
IN THE NATIONAL JUDICIAL COLLEGE, TOOLS FOR JUDGES AND COURT
PERSONNEL TO DEAL WITH THE MEDIA (undated). The Indiana state
judiciary has posted this monograph and other materials that may
be helpful to judges in dealing with the media on its website at
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/pubs/media-guide/fire-brigade.html.
Although the National Judicial College monograph as found there
is undated, a version of it was produced in 2006 (available at
http://www.nacmnet.org/PastConferences/2006Annual/Hengstler
Handout.pdf).
instructions giving the elements of each crime charged, hope-
fully you already provided that to reporters at the start of the
trial.)
10. Prepare. The coverage of court proceedings is impor-
tant. It shapes public opinion of the court system, and fair cov-
erage promotes fair trials. Given its importance, judges should
focus on preparing to handle our dealings with the media just
as we must prepare to tackle complicated legal issues, the pro-
cedural aspects of court hearings, or supervision of our staff.
These are all important parts of our job.
For a general guide, there’s a 58-page monograph prepared
by the National Judicial College.3 It provides an excellent
overview, with checklists for handling media issues during a
trial, a glossary of media terms, ethics rules followed by pro-
fessional journalists, tips on handling television interviews,
and advice for handling ambush interviews. 
When you’re actually going to talk with the media, prepare
yourself by thinking through the main point you want to
make. With limited time and space for stories, that may be all
that you can get across, and you should make sure that you at
least make that one point in clear language and a short sen-
tence or two. If it’s an on-the-record interview about your court
generally or some new initiative your court has started that
you want the public to know about, you need to say something
that’s short and quotable. Even if it’s an off-the-record inter-
view for background purposes, keep the main point in mind
and keep your language simple. That will enhance the chance
that the reporter’s understanding of what you’re trying to say
will correspond to your own.
Steve Leben is a judge on the Kansas Court of
Appeals. Before joining that court in 2007, he
spent nearly 14 years as a general-jurisdiction
trial judge in suburban Kansas City. On the
trial bench, Leben presided over two high-pro-
file murder cases that attracted national cover-
age, as well as civil and criminal cases that
were covered in Kansas City media outlets.
Leben is a 1982 graduate of the University of Kansas law school,
where he has taught a course on statutory interpretation since
2007, and a 1978 graduate of the William Allen White School of
Journalism at the University of Kansas.
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Footnotes 
1. PAMELA D. SCHULZ, COURTS ON TRIAL:  ANALYSING AND MANAGING THE
DISCOURSES OF DISAPPROVAL. 4 (2010).
2. Id. at 46.
3. This is the usual common-law judicial oath. See, for example,
Section 11 of the Oaths Act 1936 (SA). See discussion of popular-
ity, SCHULZ, supra note 1, at 112.
PAMELA D. SCHULZ, COURTS AND JUDGES ON TRIAL:  ANALYSING
AND MANAGING THE DISCOURSES OF DISAPPROVAL. Lit Verlag,
2010, 290 pp. $76.00.
This book is a broad-ranging and detailed discussion of thesometimes fraught relationships between courts, politi-cians, and the media. The author combines her practical
experience as the first public relations and information officer
with the Courts Administration Authority in South Australia
with in-depth research as a communications analyst. She has
analyzed media and their practices both in Australia and
worldwide. This has revealed much of interest about the moti-
vations and methods of journalists, politicians, and judges, as
well as implications for community confidence in the court
system and the rule of law in modern democracies. Schulz con-
cludes by offering some practical solutions to the problems she
has identified.
Courts have no direct power over citizens and merely medi-
ate executive power by validating arrest on charges, authoriz-
ing the exercise of the power of fining or imprisonment, and
quantifying and collecting judgment debts. To effectively per-
form their work, courts depend upon the confidence of the
public in the judicial process. There are very few judges, and
relatively few cases, especially in the common-law system, so
the overwhelming source of information for the general public
about courts is the media. Yet the media selects the bizarre and
sensational rather than the serious. As Schulz says, “[i]f it
bleeds, it leads,” and content is selected on the basis of the
“four C” principle:  courts, cops, crime and conflict.1 Schulz
contends that in a western world of relative safety, the media
and politicians have created a climate of fear of violent crime
to prop up their own relevance. Crime is depicted as a major
problem, and getting “tough on crime” is the simplistic solu-
tion. Part of this process is to make stories newsworthy by
finding cases where there is discontent about the result, which
is then beaten up as part of a discourse of disrespect against the
judicial process as a whole. Straight reporting is demoted in
importance in preference for conflict, problems, and denoue-
ment. 
Schulz notes that courts have used journalists in the role of
public information officers to better supply information to the
community on the courts’ own terms. However, she considers
that they have not been successful in bringing the generally
good work of courts to the attention of the public. To be effec-
tive, courts must have communication strategies that are
proactive and interactive and provide access and feedback
loops through a wide variety of pathways. In addition to a
broad range of communication strategies, courts must become
more directly involved with the public through community
and specialist courts such as drug, mental-health, and first-
nation or Nunga courts that link directly with community ser-
vices. 
Schulz develops her discussion through the discipline of
critical discourse analysis. This is a communications study
method that seeks the sometimes unstated meanings in com-
munications by looking for patterns of words and phrases and
their proximity to each other and conversely by what is sys-
tematically avoided or suppressed. She identifies a general dis-
course of disapproval of courts in the media that has developed
into discourses of disrespect, diminution, and direction. This
leaves judicial officers feeling marginalized and threatened,
while politicians have joined in so that they can be seen as 
saviors from the problem, which is largely a media construct.
Schulz identifies the use of the technique of “othering,” by
which a small group is branded and demonized so that the
majority can find a sense of unity in coming together with a
sense of rectitude to eject them. This technique, of course, has
a long unhappy history, and the marginalization of the judi-
ciary has always been a first step in the process. In this
instance, the technique has been applied first to criminals who
should be locked away for longer and to judges who fail to do
this. 
Her interviews of politicians demonstrate a disconnection
between their stated understanding of and commitment to the
rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. At the same
time, politicians think that the courts need “direction” from
them to address changing community standards, especially in
sentencing matters, which are the fodder of the press.2 They
acknowledge that the judicial role is not to be popular but to
apply the law “without fear or favor, affection or ill will.”3
On Courts and 
Communication Strategies: 
Book Review of Pamela D. Schulz, Courts and Judges on Trial: 
Analysing and Managing the Discourses of Disapproval
Andrew J. Cannon
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4. Id. at 159.
5. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (trans. Alan M.
Sheridan, 1997).
6. This headline ran in the tabloid, The Advertiser, http://www.
adelaidenow.com.au/, on July 30, 2003.
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at 448.
10. Aon Risk Services v Australian. Nat’l Univ., (2009) HCA 27, 156,
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27.html.
Although politicians acknowledge the central importance of
judicial independence in interviews with the author, Schulz
demonstrates that the same approach often is not reflected in
public comments made to the media. While it is the work of
courts to make nuanced decisions in controversial cases, when
they do, this has sometimes been described as “an unelected
and unaccountable judiciary usurping power” (judges are not
elected in Australia or Britain).4 Politicians do emphasize the
need for the language of law and judgments to be accessible,
and from their comments the author draws the need for a
media judge to enter the media arena on behalf of the judiciary. 
Schulz has assessed the view of the judges through dis-
course analysis of interviews of selected judges from all levels
of the judicial hierarchy in Australia and of their speeches.
What emerges is a primary concern about independence, and
parallel to this is an inevitable tension between the judges’
need to have a relationship of confidence with the community
and politicians and the isolation, which is inherent in their
role. They feel misrepresented and misunderstood. 
Schulz uses Foucault’s approach to power to suggest that
the widespread formation of a negative response is indicative
of an emerging challenge to power, which she sees as a chal-
lenge by elected government to the authority and indepen-
dence of the judiciary. Who leads this dance between the
media and the politicians is uncertain, but at this ball the judi-
ciary is the wallflower, and anyway, traditionally it would
refuse to dance in this infotainment world of modern media.
The Foucault approach relegates the great events in history to
tipping points preceded by multiple strands of discourse lead-
ing inexorably to the inevitable result, and then the tipping
point is exaggerated as the cause when it is largely the result.5
Not to be involved in the discourse is not to exist and is to risk
the loss of relevance, power, and the independence so valued
by the judiciary. At the same time, discourse analysis shows a
judiciary that is protective of its own methods and unwilling to
join public controversy. The author recognizes that a commit-
ment to a rule of law is bound to lead to unpopular decisions.
Indeed, it is the judiciary that stands between a tyranny of the
majority and populist oppression as they moderate the exercise
of governmental power. Schulz identifies an increasing recog-
nition in the judiciary of the need to defend the notions of
independence and the rule of law in the media and to better
educate the community through civics education and similar
means. But many of its members, as is typical with the mar-
ginalized “other,” feel powerless and are defensive. 
Schulz concludes that in the face of headlines about a court
judgment such as “THIS IS NOT JUSTICE—THIS IS A DIS-
GRACE,” the present role of a journalist information officer,
which entails ensuring accurate information is supplied to
media, holding court open days, giving school tours, and
speaking at community events and the like, is not sufficient.6
She says a fully integrated and sustained communications
strategy is required, starting with using discourse analysis to
identify the misconceptions that need to be countervailed. To
address these misconceptions, the author would have press
judges, who do not sit so they can engage in discussion of pub-
lic controversies, and communication managers, who ensure
courts do react effectively to community concerns and express
themselves so that they are understood. A range of other mea-
sures—such as a roadshow to showcase the sentencing
process, direct access to the community through cameras in
courts, and interactive websites—are recommended to make
the work of courts accessible and to provide contextual infor-
mation to the few cases the media choose to highlight. Judicial
participation and knowledge of discourse analysis is also sug-
gested to further ideas for better communication.
Criticism of courts is not new. For example, in 1934, the
High Court of Australia granted a writ of habeas corpus7 to
release a left-wing Czech journalist who had been detained as
an illegal immigrant by order of Attorney General Robert
Menzies to prevent him speaking at a conference. In response,
the Sun newspaper railed against the judges:  “If the High
Court were given some real work to do the bench would not
have time to argue for days on the exact length of the split in
the hair, and the precise difference between Tweedledum and
Tweedledee.”8
Times now are different. In that case, the editor and the
paper were each fined for contempt,9 which is unlikely to hap-
pen now. And today, with the shift of the power from the
nation-state toward corporate interests, some of which have a
worldwide controlling interest in the media, politicians and
media share a new common interest:  to maintain a discourse
of threat and sensation and to diminish the judiciary, whose
independence puts the judiciary outside their control.
Neither can it be said that the courts have no blemish. Their
independence gives them control over process and costs, and
they tolerate excessive delay and overindulgent expense on
sometimes irrelevant pretrial processes that have driven the
cost of litigation beyond the reach of the bulk of the commu-
nity. As Justice Dyson Heydon recently said in the High Court:
The presentation and adjudication of the case in the
courts below do cause it to merit a place in the precedent
books. The reasons for placing it there turn on the
numerous examples it affords of how litigation should
not be conducted or dealt with. The proceedings reveal
a strange alliance. A party which has a duty to assist the
court in achieving certain objectives fails to do so. A
court which has a duty to achieve those objectives does
not achieve them. The torpid languor of one hand
washes the drowsy procrastination of the other.10
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Courts must accept valid criticism and be prepared to rem-
edy properly identified problems. However, that is not Schulz’s
focus. Her point is that there is much damaging discourse
about courts that is merely criticism for ulterior purposes not
based on any merit. Media discourse reformulates rather than
reflects reality as the media competes with executive govern-
ment and the judiciary to represent justice and the common
good. Political and media use of law-and-order rhetoric under-
mines public confidence in courts and the rule of law that it
masquerades as discussing. 
The research on which this book is based is Australian, but
the author includes material from the UK, USA, Canada, India,
and Europe, and the book has a broad international relevance
to foster discussion in this important area. It is scholarly but
readable for general interest, so the book will serve both as a
text for interest as well as a course book in progressive law
schools and communications faculties. 
Dr. Andrew Cannon is Professor of Law at
Muenster University, Germany and Flinders
University, South Australia, as well as Deputy
Chief Magistrate and Senior Mining Warden
South Australia.
email:  Andrew.Cannon@courts.sa.gov.au   
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Editor’s Note: These AJA Bylaws amendments have been submitted by the Bylaws Committee for consideration at the AJA
Annual Conference in San Diego this September. There are four separate proposals; the comments shown are from the
Bylaws Committee.
Deletions are shown in strike-through text. New language is shown in italics. 
I. Proposed Membership Provision Changes
Purpose:  Clarify that judges from “ecclesiastical” courts and judges who have been suspended or 
removed from the bench are not eligible for membership.
Specific changes proposed:
ARTICLE III
MEMBERSHIP
Sec. 1. ELIGIBLE COURTS. An eligible Court is defined as any duly constituted judicial tribunal, serving at the local,
community, State, Provincial or National level within the United States, any of its territories and possessions, the
District of Columbia and Canada and Mexico, whether having trial or appellate, criminal, civil, or special jurisdic-
tion. Such courts do not become ineligible by reason of being State, Provincial, or territorial Courts or by reason of
having jurisdiction beyond the boundaries of the Governmental subdivision in which such courts are located. Courts
of Indian Nations of the North American Continent and Magistrates, Masters, Arbitrators, Referees of any eligible
judicial tribunal, if otherwise qualified, shall be eligible on the same basis. court of the federal, state, local, tribal,
provincial, and/or territorial governments of the United States, Canada, Mexico, and any other countries within North
America.
.
Sec. 2. VOTING MEMBERS. Upon payment of the dues herein prescribed and upon approval of the application by
the Board of Governors at any regular or special meeting, any present or former judicial officer in good standing, or
any former judicial officer who was in good standing at the time of separation, whose present or former court meets of any
court, meeting the qualifications of an eligible court as herein before defined, may become a regular voting member.
The right to approve applications for memberships may be delegated by the Board of Governors.
II. Proposed Dues Provision Changes
Purpose:  Allow for additional dues options besides annual payment, including the option of a dis
count for advance payment for multi-year membership.
Specific changes proposed:
ARTICLE IV
DUES
Sec. 1. PAYMENT.
(a) Dues for membership in the Association are payable annually per a schedule approved by the Board of Governors
and payable by the Court over which the individual member Judge presides.
(b) In the event a Court for any reason, fails to pay the dues of its Judge or Judges, any qualified Judge may apply for
individual membership and be personally responsible for payment of dues.
(c) Honorary members shall not be assessed for any dues.
PROPOSED AJA BYLAWS CHANGES
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Sec. 2. RATES
(a) Dues shall be established at an annual rate by a schedule approved by the Board of Governors. Any formal or infor-
mal association of five or more judges paying as one unit will be eligible for a discounted rate as set by the Board of
Governors. The Board of Governors may also establish an annual, reduced rate for retired judges.
III. Proposed Bylaws Amendment Procedure Change
Purpose:  Reduce costs by allowing for electronic notice of proposed bylaws changes.
Specific changes proposed:
ARTICLE XVIII
AMENDMENTS TO BYLAWS
The Bylaws may be altered, adopted, amended or rescinded only by the majority vote of the members present and
voting at the General Assembly of any Annual Conference provided, however, that notice of the proposed action of
adoption, amendment or rescission shall have been given by the Secretariat or by the proponent of the proposed
action to the members of the Association and to the members of the Board of Governors either by mail, by electronic
mail and publication on the AJA website, or by publication in an official publication of the Association posted not less
than thirty (30) days prior to such meeting; or by consent of two-thirds of the members present and voting at the
General Assembly of any such Annual Conference if thirty (30) days notice has not been given. Publication in any
official publication, mailed to the membership at least three times a year, shall constitute compliance with the afore-
said notice requirement regardless of the date of publication or mailing. The publications referred to herein are
intended to mean the official publications of this Association by whatever name or title they may bear.
IV. Proposed Bylaws Change to Add At Large Representative to Board of 
Governors
Purpose:  Address concerns raised at Denver General Assembly about general membership 
representation on governing bodies of AJA, by providing for an at large representative to the Board 
of Governors
Specific changes proposed:
ARTICLE VII
BOARD OF GOVERNORS
. . .
Sec. 2. COMPOSITION. The Board of Governors shall include as members:
. . .
(e) . . .
(f) An at large representative who shall represent the general membership of the Association. The at large representative
shall be a duly qualified member of the Association, who is not at the time of initial election to this position a currently
serving member of the Board of Governors.
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NEW PUBLICATIONS 
OF INTEREST
PAMELA M. CASEY, ROGER K. WARREN, &
JENNIFER K. ELEK, USING OFFENDER RISK
AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT INFORMATION AT
SENTENCING:  GUIDANCE FOR COURTS FROM
A NATIONAL WORKING GROUP, National
Center for State Courts, 2011. 48 pp.
http://www.ncsc.org/RNAPrinciples
Recent studies have exposed offender
recidivism as a major public-safety issue
that the courts need to address. Out of a
sample of 275,000 prisoners who were
released in 1994, two-thirds were
arrested again within 3 years. Reports
indicate that 1 in 31 adults is currently
under criminal supervision. Of course,
judges have some sense of local recidi-
vism rates, as they see the same offenders
over and over in the courtroom. But the
public is also aware of the high level of
recidivism, and general perceptions of
public safety and the criminal-justice sys-
tem suffer as a result.
The good news, according to this new
guide from a national working group, is
that a clear path to improvement exists.
The guide suggests that courts can use
more detailed information about the risks
and needs of an offender to significantly
lower the offender’s chances of being
rearrested.  
Published by the National Center for
State Courts, the guide informs judges,
attorneys, and other legal stakeholders
about how to implement or enhance risk-
and-needs-assessment information in
their jurisdictions. These assessments
detail an offender’s dynamic risk fac-
tors—that is, the factors that may still be
changed—including personality pattern,
social supports for crime, substance-
abuse issues, and family relationships.
The working group, chaired by recently
retired Alabama Chief Justice Sue Bell
Cobb, recommends that courts integrate
this individualized assessment into every
stage of the sentencing process, from
plea-bargaining to probation. 
The guide calls for judges to focus on
reducing recidivism as a primary goal of
sentencing. Appropriate classification of
offenders using risk-and-needs-assess-
ment information, in combination with
appropriate sentencing using the same
classification, can reduce recidivism by
up to 26%. And research cited in the
guide suggests that “[a] potential
decrease of even 5 or 10 percent in the
rate of recidivism is significant given cur-
rent rates of reoffending.”
As any systemic change is difficult to
initiate, the working group offers nine
principles to help courts move to a more
evidence-based system of sentencing.
The first few principles state that 
risk-and-needs-assessment information
should inform matters such as probation
conditions, but should not be used as an
aggravating or mitigating factor in deter-
mining the offender’s sentence. Risk-and-
needs-assessment information is valuable
when considering whether an offender
can be effectively supervised while on
probation, and it can aid in determining
probation conditions as well as proper
responses if the conditions are not met.
The guide then turns to education and
training. For an evidence-based system to
be successful, all stakeholders—the
judge, the defense attorney, the prosecu-
tor, the probation officer, victims advo-
cates—must be comfortable using and
interpreting risk-and-needs-assessment
information. Training can be done
through conferences, workshops, and
even webinars, including those con-
ducted by the Crime and Justice Institute.
To build an efficient evidence-based
system, the entire infrastructure of a pro-
bation department or assessment agency
should factor in the risk-and-needs-
assessment report for each offender. An
assessment report should be made avail-
able to all parties at each stage of a sen-
tencing process, and the parties should
be encouraged to use the report during
deliberations about appropriate proba-
tion conditions. 
Each jurisdiction must select tools for
integrating risk-and-needs assessments
based on its individual resources and
needs. Judges must consult with other
agencies to determine the length, format-
ting, and content of the reports, and the
data should be routinely reviewed so that
any necessary modifications may be
made to increase accuracy. When a juris-
diction is establishing a new system, peri-
odic evaluation is crucial to avoiding
damaging misclassifications.
The guide concludes by calling on
judges to lead the way in implementing
risk-and-needs-assessment information. If
a jurisdiction already uses limited evi-
dence-based practices, judges can seek to
increase the use of such materials in other
areas. Other jurisdictions will need to
begin from the ground up with judges
advocating for funding, bringing col-
leagues and other legal actors on board,
and discussing the future implementation
of risk-and-needs-assessment information. 
At every stage, the guide suggests, it’s
necessary for judges to explain the clear
benefits of using risk-and-needs-assess-
ment information:  improving public
safety, reducing recidivism, and, in many
cases, reducing excessive costs associated
with incarceration. 
The Resource Page
g
